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1 Introduction
The growth of North-South trade over the last 15 years particularly due to the emergence
of China has sparked renewed interest in the consequences of inter-industry trade and its
e¤ects on labor reallocation and income inequality (Krugman, 2000, Autor, Dorn and Gordon,
2013, and Haskel, Lawrence, Leamer and Slaughter, 2012). In addition to the e¤ects of trade
on relative factor rewards, concern has been raised over the welfare costs of protracted labor
reallocation and of the idle/lost expertise for workers whose sector is hit by import competi-
tion. More generally, the dynamics of an economys adjustment to trade shocks are critical to
understanding the benets and distributional consequences of both trade liberalizations and
trade shocks.
Yet, most models assume perfect factor mobility or complete immobility even though,
empirical results suggest that owing to short- and medium-run adjustment costs both as-
sumptions are too extreme for analyzing the impact of trade shocks on the labor market. To
address this issue, Matsuyama (1992) analyzes labor reallocation following a trade shock in
an overlapping generations model, assuming that workers can only choose their sector once in
their lives. This implies that all reallocation occurs through the entry of new generations. In
contrast, we allow for labor mobility in a Heckscher Ohlin Samuelson (HOS) model augmented
with sector-specic human capital. This endogenously generates little immediate reallocation
of labor in response to a trade shock and leads to a protracted transition, providing a better t
with the empirical ndings. This more general framework allows us to investigate additional
outcomes of trade shocks, such as the share of reallocation that happens on impact and the
distributional consequences of trade for workers of di¤erent cohorts.
The model is an overlapping generations HOS model in which new workers of both low-
and high-skill types enter the economy each period as old generations die. Both skill types are
essential in both sectors, but the sectors di¤er in their skill intensities. Workers accumulate
human capital that is specic to the sector of their employment. The empirical relevance
of sector-specic human capital has been demonstrated most notably by Neal (1995), Parent
(2000), and Kletzer (2001). Because our focus is on sector-specic human capital and sectoral
reallocation we keep the neoclassical assumption of perfectly competitive markets and we
consider an economy with homogeneous rms. This makes our analysis complementary with
recent work emphasizing within-industry reallocation, such as Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding
(2010).
In steady state, workers never switch sectors and the model replicates the standard HOS
model. Yet when prices and wages adjust in response to a trade shock, sector-specic human
capital generates endogenous rigidities. Although all workers have the opportunity to switch
sectors, not all do so and wages do not immediately equilibrate across sectors. Young workers
with little accumulated sector-specic human capital nd the higher relative wages of the
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expanding sector attractive enough to switch, whereas older workers with more accumulated
human capital nd it optimal to stay.
Our main nding is that most of the adjustment occurs not through immediate labor re-
allocation but rather through the entry of new generations of workers. Intuitively, the wage
benets of relocating to the expanding sector diminish as the economy adjusts to its new
steady state, while human capital accumulated in the sector of previous employment is perma-
nently idled if a worker switches. Consequently, even workers with a relatively small amount
of accumulated specic human capital in the shrinking sector nd it optimal not to switch.
Technically, we use approximation methods to prove that the number of people who switch
in response to a shock is second order in the price change whereas the length of adjustment
is rst order in the price change. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that the transition can be
slower when human capital accumulates faster. Given the small amount of labor reallocation
that occurs upon impact, the immediate e¤ect of a trade shock on factor rewards is tied to
sector of employment and not (as in the standard HOS model) to skill type. As the economy
moves toward the new steady state, the standard StolperSamuelson result emerges whereby
real wage changes are tied to skill type.
To relate our model to the current debate over the consequences of imports of low-skill
labor-intensive products, we consider a shock that lowers the price of goods produced by the
low-skillintensive sector. First, although sector specicity prevents some individual low-skill
workers in the shrinking sector from taking advantage of the higher wages in the expanding
sector, overall the slower adjustment benets low-skill workers because factors of production are
kept longer in the low-skillintensive sector. Second, a policy, nanced by high-skill workers,
which subsidizes workers of both types who switch sectors reduces the welfare of some of the
low-skill workers who do not move by accelerating the transition.1 This general equilibrium
impact can be large enough to decrease the aggregate lifetime income of all low-skill workers
alive at the time of the shock. This result continues to hold if one considers a retraining
program that allows workers to keep part of their sector-specic human capital when switching
sectors. Finally, there are distributional consequences across generations. For instance, low-
skill workers in the high-skill intensive-sector who are old enough benet from the decrease in
the price of the low-skill-intensive good.
In two extensions we include physical capital and nonpecuniary sector preferences. For
both extensions, most of the adjustment still occurs through the entry of new generations. We
show that the transition is slower when physical capital is general instead of sector-specic. We
also show that larger gross ows (generated by nonpecuniary sector preferences) further delay
the transition to the new steady state but cause more reallocation upon the shocks impact.
To illustrate the workings of our model, we calibrate two versions of the model to data
1Because there are no ine¢ ciencies in the economy, such a subsidy also reduces output.
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from the United States. We divide US manufacturing into two sectors of similar size according
to their skill intensity. First, to stay as close as possible to the theoretical setting, we ignore
capital and simulate a trade shock that reduces the price of the low-skill sectors product by
1 percent. The numerical results show a relatively long transition: it takes 2:11 years for low-
skill wages and 7:41 years for high-skill wages to be equalized again. Moreover, the number
of workers switching sectors in response to the trade shock is very small: only low-skill (resp.
high-skill) workers with experience less than 0:04 years (resp. 0:27 years) switch sectors. Yet,
since the di¤erence in skill intensity across sectors is small, the reallocation predicted in this
Heckscher-Ohlin model for such a small price change seems counterfactually large. Therefore,
we also calibrate the model with sector-specic capital. This allows us to study large price
changes and we nd that, in this case, even for a 20 percent price change, the initial reallocation
of workers represent less than a quarter of the steady-state reallocation.
Our results relate to a large empirical literature, typically based on the HOS-model, on the
distributional consequences of exposure to international trade, both in developing and devel-
oped countries. For developed countries, Slaughter (2000) surveys an extensive literature of the
1990s on the role of international trade in explaining rising US inequality by correlating changes
in the relative producer prices of low-skill intensive goods with relative wages of low-skilled
workers as predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. He documents a limited support for
the Stolper-Samuelson predictions especially in the 1970s, but argues that the methodology
used is too limited to make rm conclusions. Yet, other authors nd that trade played a more
substantial role in the increase in inequality in developed countries, and Wood (1995) argues
that methodology choices in computing the factor content of trade considerably a¤ect the es-
timated impact of trade on inequality. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) survey the literature on
developing countries and document that in general labor market adjustments are sluggish and
trade liberalizations have not led to the reductions in income inequality predicted by factor
endowment trade models. Though the limited labor mobility seems to contradict the central
tenets of HOS theory and to undermine the empirical relevance of the HOS theory, our model
suggests that a lack of labor reallocation and the presence of sector wage premia on impact are
fully consistent with a HOS framework that incorporates rigidities. In fact, Robertson (2004)
shows that the Stolper-Samuelson predictions emerge starting 3-5 years after a trade shock in
Mexico.2 Similarly, Gonzaga, Menezes Filho and Terra (2006) nd Stolper-Samuelson e¤ects
in Brazil.3 Mayda and Rodrik (2005) show that both in developed and developing countries
preferences over trade policy are in line with HOS theory, another indication that in the long-
run the Stolper-Samuelson theorem holds. Our model provides some guidance for evaluating
2 In addition, Robertson uses industry-specic tari¤ reductions. This addresses a potential bias in the es-
timation of wage e¤ects from trade liberalizations as tari¤ reductions are often larger for low-skill intensive
industries.
3Helpman et al. (2012), however, demonstrate that within occupations inequality (for which the HOS frame-
work is silent) increased in Brazil after trade liberalization.
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the time horizon at which Stolper-Samuelson e¤ects might become important.
The model presented here also relates to a literature that examines the short-run dynamics
of trade adjustment (Matsuyama, 1992, as mentioned, and Mayer, 1974, Mussa, 1978, and
Neary, 1978, who analyze limited capital mobility). Yet only recently have e¤orts been made
to incorporate sluggish labor adjustment into theoretical trade models. Most of these e¤orts 
some of which include sector-specic human capital focus on structurally estimated or cal-
ibrated models. For instance, Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010) structurally estimate a
dynamic rational expectations model of labor adjustment in which nonpecuniary idiosyncratic
shocks in moving costs are the sole source of rigidities. Their model does not feature entering
generations and sector-specic human capital, which (as we show) can endogenously generate
rigidities for pecuniary reasons. Kambourov (2009) shows in a calibrated model that, in the
presence of sector-specic human capital, ring costs reduce the benets from trade liberal-
ization. Closer to our work, Cos¸ar (2013) calibrates a model with overlapping generations,
sector-specic human capital, and job search, and Dix-Carneiro (2014) estimates a structural
model with overlapping generations, sector-specic human capital, and switching costs.4 To
complement this literature, we focus on deriving sharp analytical predictions from a parsimo-
nious dynamic HOS model in which the only impediment to labor mobility is sector-specic
human capital. We discuss in more detail how these two papers compare and relate to our
work in the main text.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline the model and derive the
steady-state equilibrium. In Section 3 we analyze the transitional path, and in Section 4 we
discuss the welfare implications of sector-specic human capital and its impact on the role
of a trade adjustment policy. Section 5 presents two extensions featuring physical capital and
nonpecuniary sector preferences. In Section 6, we calibrate and simulate the model, and Section
7 concludes. The main proofs and details on the calibration can be found in Appendix A, the
remaining proofs are in Appendix B, which is available online.
2 The model
2.1 Production technology
We build a dynamic version of the standard, small open economy, HOS model. Time is
continuous. At each point in time, two goods (indexed by i = 1; 2) are produced competitively
using two factors of production: low-skill and high-skill human capital. We denote the stock
of low-skill and high-skill human capital in sector i by Li and Hi, with per-unit wages of wi
4Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015) provide empirical evidence on the slow adjustment of labor markets in Brazil
following trade liberalization. Their work focuses on labor reallocation across regions and between the formal
and informal sectors, instead of labor reallocation across tradeable sectors. Yet, their results are consistent with
a model where factors are initially sector-specic and adjust slowly.
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and vi, respectively.5 We assume that the production functions Yi = Fi (Li; Hi) are concave,
exhibit constant returns to scale (CRS), are twice di¤erentiable, and have weakly positive cross
partial derivatives (@2Fi=@Li@Hi  0). We use FiZ to denote the derivative of the production
function in sector i with respect to factor Z 2 fL;Hg.
Sector 1 is assumed to be high-skill intensive at every wage ratio. Let good 1 be the
numéraire and let the price of good 2 be p, which is set exogenously at the world price. Com-
petitive labor markets imply that human capital is paid its marginal product, and competitive
goods markets imply that prices equal marginal costs.
To this standard framework we add overlapping generations of workers who accumulate
nontransferable sector-specic human capital in their sector of employment. The stock of
specic human capital for an individual worker in a particular sector is given by the (weakly)
increasing function xZ (a)  0, Z 2 fL;Hg, where a is the amount of time for which the worker
has accumulated human capital in a given sector.6 Note that the accumulation functions are
di¤erent across types but the same across sectors. Our results can be generalized without
a¤ecting any of the qualitative results to accumulation functions which di¤er across sectors.
The wage of a low-skill worker of experience a in sector i = 1; 2 is thus wixL (a), while the wage
of a high-skill worker of the same experience is vixH (a). Complete nontransferability implies
that a sector switcher must start over from xZ (0), although the worker could employ human
capital accumulated in his previous sector if he moved back. Labor within a given skill type
is perfectly substitutable, so the total stock of human capital is the sum of the human capital
for all workers employed in the sector.
This setup is motivated by ndings in the labor economics literature that sector-specic
human capital is important. Neal (1995) uses US data from displaced worker surveys to
compare workers who are displaced and switch sectors with those who do not. He nds that
the semi-elasticity of the wage loss at displacement with respect to tenure is 23 times as
high for industry switchers. Neal also shows that workers who switch jobs but stay in the
same sector are rewarded for their previous tenure as if it were seniority within their new rm,
providing further evidence that an important component of human capital is sector-specic.
Similarly, Parent (2000) demonstrates that much of the measured return to rm seniority loads
on industry tenure when it is included in a regression, and Kletzer (2001) shows that displaced
workersearnings losses rise with tenure and age but are lower for workers who stay in the same
sector. In addition, Dix-Carneiro (2014) structurally estimates that the returns to seniority
5Although wi and vi technically denote the returns to a unit of human capital, we will abuse language slightly
and refer to them as low-skill wagesand high-skill wages, respectively.
6There is some debate in labor economics over the relative importance of sector and rm-specic human
capital. If we were to include rm-specic human capital, then issues of bargaining would arise. Since we
deliberately adhere closely to assumptions of the original HOS model including that of perfect competition in
the labor market we focus solely on sector-specic human capital. Yet the e¤ects derived here would also be
present in a model with rm-specic human capital.
5
are imperfectly transferable across sectors in Brazil.7
Each overlapping generation lives for T periods, and the population grows at the rate of
 > 0. Without loss of generality, we normalize the size of the population of low-skill and
high-skill workers born at time t = 0 to 1 and H (respectively). For each type of worker
Z 2 fL;Hg, we denote by Zi (t) the mass of human capital of workers of skill type Z who work
in sector i 2 f1; 2g. To solve for the model in a convenient form, we dened the normalized
mass of human capital in sector zi (t) (with z = l for low-skill workers and z = h for high-skill
workers) as the mass of human capital in sector i normalized by the size of the population of
low-skill workers born at time t; thus, z1 (t) = Z1 (t) =et. Let nZ (t) be the fraction of newborn
workers of type Z who enter sector 1 at time t. If nobody has moved during their lifetime,
then l1 (t) =
R T
0 nL (t  ) e xL () d and h1 (t) = H
R T
0 nH (t  ) e xH () d and with
analogous expressions for sector 2. Competitive labor markets and CRS production functions
imply that we can write wages as a function of normalized factors:
w1 (t) = F1L (l1 (t) ; h1 (t)) and w2 (t) = pF2L (l2 (t) ; h2 (t)) ; (1)
v1 (t) = F1H (l1 (t) ; h1 (t)) and v2 (t) = pF2H (l2 (t) ; h2 (t)) : (2)
2.2 Preferences
In a natural extension of the static HOS model, all workers have identical time-separable
preferences with discount rate . The lifetime utility of worker i at time t of age  with
consumption prole [C1i () ; C2i ()]
t+T 
=t is given byZ t+T 
t
e ( t)u (C1i () ; C2i ()) d;
where u (C1; C2) is assumed to be homogeneous of degree 1 (a worker is of age 0 when he
enters the labor force). The consumption prole is indexed by individual i because it can, in
principle, depend on the history of an individuals sectoral employment. Let P (t) be the ideal
price index associated with utility function u () and the prices of consumption goods in period
t. Workers choose their sector of employment each period to maximize lifetime utility, which
with income [Wi ()]
t+T 
=t is Z t+T a
t
e ( t)
Wi ()
P ()
d:
If prices are expected to be xed over the lifetime horizon, then this choice is equivalent to
choosing the sector with the highest discounted lifetime income at labor market entry.8
7Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) nd a substantial return to occupational tenure. To the extent that nely
dened occupations di¤er across sectors, occupation-specic human capital can be reinterpreted as a form of
sector-specic human capital.
8Our assumption that the utility function is homogeneous of degree 1 simplies the analysis by pinning down
the interest rate to the pure time-discount rate . For small price changes, which are the focus of our analysis,
this assumption is innocuous (provided there is a domestic assets market). See footnote 11.
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2.3 Steady state
As is standard, we consider only parameters for which there is not complete specialization.
Because the skill accumulation functions are identical across sectors, incomplete specialization
implies that steady-state wages are equalized across sectors at wss and vss for low-skill and
high-skill workers, respectively. This, in turn, means that workers never switch sectors, as doing
so would result in a loss of human capital without a higher wage per e¤ective unit (therefore,
the experience of a worker in his sector of employment is the same as his age). The total
stock of normalized human capital is then lmax =
R T
0 e
 xL () d for low-skill workers and
hmax = H
R T
0 e
 xH () d for high-skill workers. Wage equalization across sectors implies
that
wss = F1L (nLl
max; nHh
max) = pF2L ((1  nL) lmax; (1  nH)hmax) ; (3)
vss = F1H (nLl
max; nHh
max) = pF2H ((1  nL) lmax; (1  nH)hmax) : (4)
This steady state of the normalized model is isomorphic to the HOS model. Hence, the
StolperSamuelson theorem implies that, if p falls, then the new steady state will feature an
increase in production in sector 1, an increase in the relative factor rewards to high-skill workers
v=w, and an increase in the relative use of low-skill workers in both sectors. These results are
stated formally as follows.
Lemma 1 The steady state equilibrium described by (3) and (4) is isomorphic to the HOS
models equilibrium with lmax and hmax endowments of factors. In particular, the Stolper
Samuelson theorem is replicated such that, for a price change from p to p0 with p0 < p,
wss0   wss
wss
<
p0   p
p
< 0 <
vss0   vss
vss
;
where vss0 and wss0 are the respective steady-state values of high- and low-skill wages for price
p0.
3 Transitional dynamics
3.1 Description
This papers principal contribution consist of analyzing the transition between the two steady
states. For expositional clarity, we consider an unexpected instantaneous and permanent down-
ward shift (at time 0) in the price of the good produced by the low-skillintensive sector (sector
2) from p to p0.
We conduct our analysis with the aid of Figure 1, which plots the isocost curves dened
by 1 = c1 (w1; v1) and p = c2 (w2; v2) as implied by the zero-prot conditions. The initial
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Figure 1: Transition paths along the cost curves
Notes: The wage paid to a unit of low-skill human capital is w and the wage paid to a unit of high-skill human
capital is v. The economy is originally in a steady state at point A, at the intersection of the two loci along
which price equals marginal cost in each sector. Sector 1 is high-skill intensive. A trade shock causes the price
of the good produced by sector 2 to drop. On impact, wages in sector 2 shift to point B0(and wages in sector 1
to point A0). As new generations enter, the economy transitions along the two cost curves (as indicated by the
arrows) to reach the new steady state at point C.
steady state is at point A, where v1 = v2 = vss and w1 = w2 = wss. A well-known property
of such cost curves is that the perpendicular vector at a given point gives the relative use
of factors; the atter slope of the vector associated with sector 2 reects this sectors being
more low-skill intensive than sector 1. A drop in prices in sector 2 to p0 moves the isocost
curve associated with sector 2s zero-prot condition southwest; hence, for a given allocation
of labor, wages for both types in sector 2 decline proportionally. The eventual steady state
is then given by point C, which implies higher relative wages for high-skill workers (i.e., the
standard StolperSamuelson theorem described previously).
The following proposition characterizes the transitional phase for a small price change from
p to p0.
Proposition 1 For a (small) price drop from p to p0 (with dp  p0   p < 0), there exists
an equilibrium fully described by the wage paths (w1 (t) ; w2 (t) ; v1 (t) ; v2 (t))
1
t=0 and the tuple
ft1; t2; aL; aHg, where the following statements hold.
 There is a worker of age aZ (Z 2 fL;Hg) in sector 2 who is indi¤erent between moving and
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not moving. All workers of type Z who are younger than aZ in sector 2 move to sector 1; all
older workers remain.
 Workers move only on impact of the trade shock at t = 0.
 The time at which wages are equalized rst is given by w1 (t1) = w2 (t1) and v1 (t2) = v2 (t2).
Moreover, w1 (t) = w2 (t) for all t  t1 and v1 (t) = v2 (t) for all t  t2.
 The equilibrium maximizes the present value of production.
Proof. See Section A.1 in the Appendix.
The proof is given for marginal price changes and requires a positive population growth  >
0.9 In Section 6, we establish that the same equilibrium exists for reasonable parameter values
with nonmarginal price changes. We provide intuition for the structure of the equilibrium here.
First, the transition to the new steady state cannot be immediate. If it were, then a
su¢ cient number of workers would switch sectors for wages to equalize across sectors. In that
case, some workers would experience a loss in human capital without an o¤setting increase in
wages and so the move for them would not have been optimal. Second, there will be some sector
switching at time 0. This is because the youngest workers have little human capital to lose by
switching from sector 2 to sector 1, so a di¤erence in wages, (as implied by noninstantaneous
adjustment) will lead some workers to move.
The equilibrium is e¢ cient in the sense that it maximizes the present value of production
from time 0 to innite (if  > , this present value of production is innite, but the equilibrium
still maximizes the present value of production from time 0 up until any time t  T ).
These two points can also be illustrated using Figure 1. As already mentioned, point A
gives the original steady state. During the transition, the economy will be described by two
points, one for each sector on its corresponding isocost curve, until wages are again equalized.
If there were no immediate reallocation, then wages in sector 2 would be given by point B and
there would be a proportional drop of dp=p in both low- and high-skill wages in that sector.
Instead, since there is some reallocation on impact, the economy jumps to point B0, which is
near point B in a sense to be made precise shortly (although B0 is to the northwest of B
in gure 1, the opposite positions are possible). Wages in sector 1 are described by a point
A0 near A. The equilibrium wages in the two sectors eventually transition along each sectors
respective isocost curve until point C, the new steady state.10 As neither high-skill nor low-
9A positive growth rate is required for mostly technical reasons. After T  max faL; aHg time periods, when
the rst movers are dying out, the loss of human capital from dying generations takes a discrete jump for which
new entering generations must compensate. Some population growth ensures that the entering generation is
large enough (relative to the loss of human capital from dying generations) that no worker would want to switch
sectors again; in our simulations, a growth rate of 2 percent was su¢ cient. Alternatively, some gross ow
between the sectors (for instance because of stochastic nonpecuniary sector preferences of workers) could be
used to circumvent the problem.
10Point C describes the wages of the new steady-state, but these wages are reached before all variables reach
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skill wages can be instantaneously equalized, v1 (0) > v2 (0), w1 (0) > w2 (0), and B0 lies to the
southwest of A0. Since we consider an equilibrium in which once wages have been equalized
they remain equalized, the equilibrium point in sector 2 must always lie weakly southwest of
the equilibrium point in sector 1, and v1 (t)  v2 (t) and w1 (t)  w2 (t) at all points.
Dene the ages of the low-skill and high-skill workers who are indi¤erent to moving as aL
and aH , respectively. These ages are given by:Z T aL
0
w1 ()xL () e
 d =
Z T aL
0
w2 ()xL (aL + ) e
 d; (5)
Z T aH
0
v1 ()xH () e
 d =
Z T aH
0
v2 ()xH (aH + ) e
 d ; (6)
here the left-hand (resp., right-hand) side equals the lifetime earnings associated with switching
to sector 1 and (resp., staying in sector 2). A worker older than the indi¤erent worker will lose
more sector-2specic capital and would have fewer years to enjoy the higher wages in sector
1; hence he will remain in sector 2. Similar logic implies that all workers younger than the
indi¤erent worker will switch.
Because wages are not completely equalized on impact, all new workers will enter sector
1 for some time. Low-skill (resp. high-skill) workers will do so until w1 (t) = w2 (t) (resp.
v1 (t) = v2 (t)) which by denition occurs rst at t = t1 (resp. t = t2). Without loss of
generality, we consider parameter values for which t1 < t2. Doing so implies that the normalized
stock of low-skill human capital in sector 1 at time t  t1 can be written as the sum of the
mass of existing workers prior to time 0 (term 1), the mass of workers that move at time 0
(term 2), and newly born workers who all enter sector 1 until wages are equalized at time t1
(term 3):
l1 (t) = nL
Z T
t
e xL () d| {z }
term 1
+ e t (1  nL)xL (t)
Z aL
0
e d| {z }
term 2
+
Z t
0
e xL () d| {z }
term 3
; (7)
for 0  t  t1. The mass of low-skill human capital in sector 2 is given by the mass of those
who stay, l2 = (1  nL)
R T
t+aL
e xL () d . Equivalent expressions hold for high-skill workers
whose wages are equalized at t = t2.
The transition can therefore be split into three phases. In phase I (t < t1) we have
w1 (t) > w2 (t) and v1 (t) > v2 (t), and new workers enter only sector 1. In phase II (t1  t < t2),
w1 (t) = w2 (t) and v1 (t) > v2 (t); in this phase, low-skill workers enter both sectors (and so
keep wages equal across sectors) while high-skill workers enter only sector 1. In phase III
(t2  t) we have w1 (t) = w2 (t) and v1 (t) = v2 (t), and the allocation of entering workers
across sectors ensures that wages remain equalized for both types.
their new steady state levels. The Rybczynski theorem guarantees that, once wages are equalized, they will
remain so until human capital reaches its maximum level and the new steady state is reached.
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It is worth noting that, in each phase, the model is isomorphic to a series of well-studied
models in trade theory. During phase I, the model is isomorphic to a series of models with
completely sector-specic factors. During phase II, it is isomorphic to a series of Jones (1971)
models. Finally, in phase III it is isomorphic to a series of HOS models.
3.2 Adjustment through new generations
To assess the extent to which the adjustment to the new steady state occurs by workers
switching sectors versus new generations entering the workforce in one sector only, we use a
Taylor expansion to obtain explicit expressions for the age of the indi¤erent workers as well as
the time until wages are equalized. We formalize the results as follows.
Proposition 2 Given the price change described in Proposition 1, the following statements
hold.
 The times until equalization of wages t1 and t2 are of rst order in dp. If t1 < t2, then t1 is
given by
t1 =
wss
(1  nL)xL (0) [w1L + w2L] + (1  nH)xH (0)H [w1H + w2H ]
dp
p
+ o (dp) ; (8)
where wiZ denotes the derivative of low-skill wages in sector i = 1; 2 with respect to labor type
Z 2 fL;Hg.
 The ages of the indi¤erent workers aL and aH are of second order in dp. If t1 < t2, then aL
is given by:
aL =   xL (0) t1
2
R T
0 e
 x0L () d
dp
p
+ o
 
dp2

: (9)
Proof. See Section A.1.
Similar expressions hold for the age aH of the indi¤erent high-skill worker and the time
t2 at which high-skill wages are equalized; these expressions are derived in the Appendix.11
Symmetric expressions hold when t1 > t2. The age of the indi¤erent worker is of second
order whereas the time until wages are equalized again is of rst order, which implies that
most of the adjustment is driven by entry. Formally, the total amount of low-skill human
capital reallocated in steady-state is rst order in the price change and can be written as
dlss1 =
(v1H+v2H)w
ss vss(w1H+w2H)
(v1H+v2H)(w1L+w2L) (w1H+w2H)2
dp
p , while the mass of low-skill human capital moving
upon shock is given by aL (1  nL)xL (0). Hence the initial adjustments share of total labor
reallocation for low-skill workers, L, is given by
L =
 xL (0)wss

(v1H + v2H) (w1L + w2L)  (w1H + w2H)2

dp
p + o (dp)
2
R T
0 e
 x0L () d ((v1H + v2H)wss   vss (w1H + w2H))

w1L + w2L +
(1 nH)xH(0)
(1 nL)xL(0)H (w1H + w2H)
 ;
(10)
11With a more general homothetic function and domestic asset markets, the proposition still holds if one
replaces  with the steady-state interest rate in equation (9).
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which is rst-order and increasing in the price change (and so is the equivalent term for
high-skill workers). In other words, whereas Matsuyama (1992) exogenously imposes that no
workers can reallocate, we endogenously derive that few will do so. The endogenous choice of
reallocation has the additional benet of enabling us to analyze policy designed to increase the
number of workers that reallocate on impact (see Section 4.3).
To understand the intuition behind this result, consider the indi¤erent low-skill workers
costs and benets of moving to sector 1, which are plotted in Figure 2. The benets are a
higher wage per unit of human capital until time t1, when wages are again equalized. Because
the wage di¤erence and the time until wages equalize are both rst order in the price change,
these benets will be second order in that price change. The costs are a lower level of sector-
specic human capital, and since a worker has no incentive to switch back they represent,
in e¤ect, a permanent loss of this human capital. The costs are thus rst order in the age
of the worker at the time of the trade shock. The age of the indi¤erent worker equates costs
and benets; therefore, whereas t1 is of rst order in the price drop, the age of the indi¤erent
worker is second order in that price change.12 The assumption of rational expectation plays
a crucial role here: it is because workers correctly anticipate that the wage gap will quickly
close that very few workers move. Alternative assumptions about expectations could make the
mass of switchers rst order.
Equation (8) follows from noting that the low-skill worker wage di¤erential created on
impact is given by wssdp=p and that the denominator in (8) captures the e¤ect on this wage
di¤erential of the inow of new generations. The adjustment time depends on the share of peo-
ple already allocated to sector 2, the production function, and the human capital accumulation
function.
Perhaps surprisingly, more rapid sector specic human capital accumulation can have a
negative e¤ect on the speed of adjustment. This follows because a faster accumulation of
human capital has two opposing e¤ects on the speed of transition. After a move, switchers
accumulate new human capital more quickly. Yet, since all workers accumulate human capital
faster, the total stock of human capital in the economy is higher, such that any given change
in human capital has a smaller impact on relative wages. As most of the adjustment occurs
through entry, the transition period must be longer. To see that the second e¤ect can dominate,
consider the special case in which the high-skill and low-skill capital accumulation functions
are proportional that is, xH = xL for  a constant; then replace the low-skill capital ac-
cumulation function with some bxL (a)  xL (a), where bxL (0) = xL (0) and bxL (T ) = xL (T ),
and replace the high-skill capital accumulation function with bxH = bxL. Such a function
implies the same initial and terminal levels of human capital, but faster accumulation. Since
12The result that few people move does not depend on the permanent and unanticipated nature of the price
shock we are considering. If the price change were perceived to be temporary then the incentive to move would
be even lower.
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Figure 2: Intuition For aL Being of Second Order
Notes: The shaded area in the upper panel shows the benets of switching (a higher wage in sector 1 relative to
sector 2) while the shaded are in the lower panel shows the costs (forgone accumulated human capital). This
explains why few individuals move on impact: the benets are second order in the price change but the costs
are rst order. For the shaded areas to be equal, the number of switchers must be small.
w1L = F1LL (nLl
max; nHh
max) is the second derivative of a CRS production function, it is ho-
mogenous of degree  1. Hence, the change in capital accumulation function from (xL; xH) to
(bxL; bxH) will increase lmax and hmax proportionally and thereby decrease w1L; w2L; w1H ; w2H
and increase the time until wages are equalized. This comparative static extends to t2, the
time at which wages of high-skill workers are equalized.13
Equation (9) results from noting that a rst-order approximation to the accumulated wage
di¤erence is 1=2t1wssdp=p per unit of human capital (which is close to xL (0) for the indi¤erent
worker) while a rst-order approximation to the loss is given by aLwss
R T
0 e
 x0L () d since,
for every subsequent period, the workers human capital will be lower by x0L (t) aL. Faster
accumulation of human capital has an ambiguous e¤ect on the number of people moving.
As explained previously, it increases t1 but also increases the denominator of (8) if the time
13This results is formally proved in Appendix B.2. An analogous argument demonstrates that the length of
the transition is decreasing in the rate of population growth  when the accumulation function is identical across
sectors.
13
discount rate is positive:
R T
0 e
 bxL ()0 d > R T0 e xL ()0 d if  > 0. When human capital
increases faster, losing a given level of experience represents a bigger loss of human capital in
the short run and a smaller loss in the long run; with positive discounting, the initial bigger
loss matters more. Even so, the initial adjustments share of total labor reallocation increases
when the learning curve becomes steeper.14
Further insight into the transition process can be gained by considering the special case of
CES production functions. When the elasticity of substitution, , is the same in both sectors,
equation (8) can be written as
t1 =
  dpp
(1 nL)xL(0)
lmax
h
1H
nL
+ 2H1 nL
i
  (1 nH)xH(0)Hhmax
h
1H
nH
+ 2H1 nH
i + o (dp) ; (11)
where iH is the factor share of high-skill workers in sector i = 1; 2. Consider the rst term
in the denominator. Each period, a fraction (1   nL)xL(0)=lmax of low-skill human capital is
reallocated from sector 2 to sector 1 through the death of old and the entry of new generations.
This reduces low-skill wages in sector 1 and increases them in sector 2. The relative importance
of these two e¤ects in closing the low-skill wage gap across sectors is captured by the relative
importance of 1H=nL and 2H=(1   nL). As is standard, the e¤ect on low-skill wages from
changes in relative factors depends on the factor share of high skill workers, iH , but the
original allocation of low-skill workers is crucial: if nL is close enough to 1 that most low-skill
labor was initially allocated to sector 1, then the reallocation from sector 2 has little e¤ect on
sector-1 wages and so most of the adjustment in the wage gap comes from sector 2. The second
term in the denominator captures the reallocation of high-skill workers. The interpretation
is analogous except that the term is negative because the reallocation of high-skill workers to
sector 1 widens the low-skill wage gap. Since the adjustment transpires through changes in
factor intensity, the elasticity of substitution, , plays a crucial role. For higher , any change
in factor intensity is associated with a smaller change in wages and thus, a longer adjustment
time.
Our model shows that the absence of short-run labor reallocation does not mean that
HeckscherOhlin forces are unimportant. This is consistent with empirical research such as
Revenga (1992) and Artuc et al. (2010) who nd substantial inter-industry labor reallocation
for the United States at a 5 years horizon. In developing countries, labor reallocation tends to
take more time, as additional sources of rigidities are likely to play a larger role.15
14The transformation of xL into bxL does not a¤ect the second fraction in (10), so L increases. One can
easily demonstrate that H also increases when the learning curve becomes steeper.
15For instance, Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) consider 25 episodes of liberalization across many countries and
nd, over 25 year horizons, no evidence of labor reallocation at the 1-digit level and only weak evidence at the
3-digit level. Topalova (2010) nds very limited labor reallocation in India, partly because of very rigid labor
laws. Menezes Filho and Muendler (2011) study Brazils trade liberalization using linked employeremployee
data and nd that trade liberalization induces job displacement; however, exporters in comparative advantage
14
In addition, the model predicts that young workers are more responsive to trade shocks,
which is consistent with the data. Kletzer (2001) shows that workers with low tenure are
considerably more likely to be displaced as a result of product competition from imports. More
generally, our model predicts that the net ows of workers between sectors is more sensitive
to wage di¤erentials for younger workers. Artuc et al. (2010) structurally estimate a model
which does not feature sector-specic human capital; they nd cost of switching sectors that
are around 30 per cent lower for young workers than old workers.16
Closer to our work, Dix-Carneiro (2014) structurally estimates a dynamic Roy model with
high- and low-skill labor, multiple sectors, capital, a labor supply decision, moving costs, and
human capital that is imperfectly transferable across sectors. He matches gross ows across
sectors by including idiosyncratic productivity and taste shocks. The model is estimated using
matched employeremployee data from Brazil. He nds a substantial role for sector-specic
human capital with yearly accumulation rates of around 4 to 9 per cent. He simulates a trade
shock of a 30 percent reduction in tari¤s on the high-tech industry and nds a relatively large
and fast labor reallocation, with 80 percent adjustment after only three years. Relative to
our analysis, two reasons can explain this quick reallocation. First, the price shock is large
(the reallocation is slower when he considers a 10 percent price shock). Second, the trade
experiment is performed on the sector for which human capital is most easily transferred to
other sectors.
Similarly, Cos¸ar (2013) builds an overlapping generations model, which features both search
frictions and sector-specic human capital, and then calibrates this model using aggregate data
from Brazil. Cos¸ars quantitative results suggest that sector-specic human capital is critical
to explaining the sluggishness of the transition.
Note that the result that reallocation on impact is second order in the price change would
apply in more general settings than that of a HOS model. Any model with overlapping gener-
ations and perfect foresight where reallocation costs are not proportional to the price change
would feature this result.
sectors hire fewer workers in the short term, which results in a slow labor reallocation process. Goldberg and
Pavcnik (2007) review the literature on trade liberalization in the developing world and show that, in almost
every case, labor reallocation in the short run was extremely limited.
16Kambourov (2009) nds that industry mobility decline sharply with age in the United States: over the time
period 1969-1997, they estimate a probability of switching industry at the 2-digit level of 21.3% per year for
23-28 year old high-skill workers (that is workers with at least some college education), but a probability of
switching of 4% for 47-69 year old high-skill workers (for unskilled workers the corresponding numbers are 25%
and 4.8%). These estimates are for steady-state gross ows though and are therefore not directly comparable
with our analysis.
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4 Welfare implications
The structure of the model allows us to conduct welfare analysis across sectors, skill types, and
generations. We begin in Section 4.1 by analyzing the e¤ects on real factor rewards. In Section
4.2 we turn to a welfare analysis that compares our model economy to one in which human
capital is not sector specic. Finally, in Section 4.3, we consider the role of trade adjustment
assistance.
4.1 Real factor rewards
Since few workers switch sectors in the immediate aftermath of the trade shock and since our
model replicates the HOS model in the long run, the following corollary holds.
Corollary 1 Consider a price change and equilibrium as described in Proposition 1. Then,
for small price changes:
 in the short run, wages are tied to sector of employment and move proportionally with price;
 in the long run, wages are tied to the type of skill and so the StolperSamuelson theorem
applies.
Consequently immediately after a price shock, the real wage of workers in sector 1 (includ-
ing those who moved) will be higher than without the shock, irrespective of their skill level.
Similarly, all workers in sector 2 will have a lower real wage than without the trade shock.
This occurs because the wage change is rst order in the price change, while the reallocation of
workers is second order. Therefore, for small price changes, the direct e¤ect of the price change
dominates the indirect e¤ect going through workersreallocation. Once wages are equalized,
however, the StolperSamuelson result applies; therefore starting at some time before wages
are equalized for both skill types, all high-skill workers will have a higher real wage than with-
out the price shock and the opposite will hold for low-skill workers. Hence, old workers from
sector 1 benet from the price change and old workers from sector 2 lose from it; whereas
whether young workers lose or gain depends on their skill type. In fact, several papers have
reported that real wages do not follow StolperSamuelsons prediction in the short run (see the
survey by Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). Our results show that this nding does not preclude
the StolperSamuelson theorem from accounting accurately for the welfare consequences of
trade liberalization for most of the population (as mentioned in the introduction, this is in
line with Robertson, 2004, who nd Stolper-Samuelson e¤ects at a 3-5 years horizon, and with
Mayda and Rodrik, 2005, who nd that political preferences regarding trade policies fall along
Stolper-Samuelsons predictions).
It also follows from the corollary that the skill premium controlling for the industry of
employment does not change on impact, yet the economys overall skill premium increases
since the trade shock favors the high-skill intensive sector. As the economy moves towards
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steady-state, the aggregate skill premium increases further (the within sector dynamics are
quite complicated, and we will return to them in Section 6).
Here the supply of skills has been kept exogenous. In a HOS model where the proportion
of high-skill and low-skill workers is endogenous, for instance because of heterogeneous costs of
schooling, an increase in the skill premium would be associated with an increase in the share
of high-skill workers. This, however, would not a¤ect the steady-state skill premium, which is
entirely determined by international prices, and therefore is the same whether the supply of
skills is endogenous or not. In our model with sector-specic human capital, similar dynamics
would apply, but, since the skill premium increases gradually, the share of high-skill workers
would also increase gradually until max (t1; t2).
4.2 Comparison with a model of general human capital
In order to identify the winners and losers from the nontransferability of human capital, we
compare our economy with one in which any accumulated human capital is general and can
costlessly be utilized in both sectors. Such an economy features instantaneous adjustment to
the new steady state and, since all human capital is fully transferable, the model is isomorphic
to the standard HOS model at all times. We dene the aggregate welfare of a generation as
the sum of the discounted lifetime income of all its members. Then, following an unanticipated
and permanent price shock, the aggregate welfare of a given generation born before the price
change must be lower under sector-specic than under general human capital. In the context of
a model with general human capital, the allocation of the sector-specic human capital model
is equivalent to a misallocation of factors.17
Proposition 3 For an unanticipated permanent price drop in the low-skillintensive sectors
product:
 all low-skill workers are better-o¤ in the economy with sector-specic human capital than in
the economy with general human capital; and
 all high-skill workers are worse-o¤ in the sector-specic human capital economy than in the
economy with general human capital.
Proof. See Section A.2.
17 It further holds that the di¤erence in total welfare is third order in the price change. By the envelope
theorem, a small factor misallocation has only a second-order e¤ect on the total value of production, and the
factors are misallocated for only a short period of time (until wages are equalized); hence the overall e¤ect is
of third order. The sector-specic human capital economy su¤ers also from the loss of e¤ective units of human
capital that results when workers who switch sectors must begin anew to accumulate human capital in their
new sector. However, this loss is only fourth order because the mass of switchers is second order and each
switcher will have accumulated only a second-order amount of human capital. Therefore, it is the indirect
consequence namely, the lack of mobility across sectors that explains most of the cost of human capitals
nontransferability.
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The transition created by the nontransferability of human capital protectslow-skill work-
ers.18 It is noteworthy that even the low-skill workers who switch sectors (and therefore lose
sector-specic human capital) are better-o¤ with sector-specic than with general human cap-
ital. The logic behind this result is based on Corollary 1: in the sector-specic human capital
economy, wages for low-skill workers are at their lowest point in the long run (when the Stolper
Samuelson theorem applies); in a general human capital economy, however, the steady state
is reached immediately. Proposition 3 suggests a qualication to the typical argument that
slow adjustment is costly for those in a sector adversely a¤ected by trade shocks. If we seek
to make this argument for the low-skill workers, then sector-specic human capital and other
factor rigidities are insu¢ cient. One would need to add other elements such as unemploy-
ment and search frictions, from which this model abstracts in order to generate a decline in
the welfare of low-skill workers due to a slow transition.
4.3 Trade adjustment assistance policy
To build further on this point, we next consider the impact of a relocation program for work-
ers willing to switch to sector 1; similar programs, which aim at accelerating the transition,
are studied in Cos¸ar (2013) and Dix-Carneiro (2014). More specically, we assume that the
government distributes some income with a present value SZ to all workers of type Z who per-
manently switch from sector 2 to sector 1 at time t = 0.19 For simplicity, we focus on the case
where the accumulation functions are proportional to each other (i.e. xH (t) = xL (t)), and
we assume that the sum received by both groups is proportional to their steady-state wages,
that is, there is a subsidy coe¢ cient s such that SL = sxL (0)wss and SH = sxH (0) vss. The
program is nanced through lump-sum taxation on high-skill workers. Because there are no
ine¢ ciencies in our economy, such a program has a negative impact on output and so will hurt
the economy as a whole.
Assuming that s is rst order in the price change and small enough that full adjustment
is not reached on impact, the structure of the equilibrium will be conserved. However, the
number of workers switching on impact is now rst order and determined by the cut-o¤ wages
aL = aH + o (dp) = s+ o (dp) ; (12)
with   xL (0)
R T
0 xL ()
0 e d
 1
. At rst order, the age of the indi¤erent worker is the
same for high-skill and low-skill workers. As a result, such a subsidy program simply shifts the
18For a specic generation of a given skill type, the di¤erence between its welfare in the sector-specic human
capital economy and its welfare in the general human capital economy is second order.
19For simplicity we assume that the government does not di¤erentiate between workers of di¤erent ages,
although doing so would not change our results. We assume that workers who switch back to sector 2 must
reimburse the government; we could instead assume that payments are distributed over time in such a way
that workers never want to move back. Finally, we assume that the income is distributed over time so that old
workers do not move simply to benet from the subsidy just before dying.
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transition process, so that the economy at time t is identical (at rst order) to the economy
without the subsidy at time t + s. Since low-skill wages are higher during the transition
than in steady-state, this subsidy program hurts the group of low-skill workers who do not
directly benet from it.20 For a small subsidy only few low-skill workers move and although
the recipients of the program benet, the direct impact of the program on aggregate low-skill
income is small. In spite of the subsidy program being nanced entirely by high-skill workers,
the aggregate income of low-skill workers can su¤er from it, as stipulated in the following
proposition.21
Proposition 4 Consider a small price change, and assume that the subsidy coe¢ cient s is
rst order in the price change and that full adjustment is not reached. Then the aggregate
present value of lifetime income of all low-skill workers alive at t = 0 is reduced by the subsidy
if s is small enough.
Proof. See Section B.3.
For CES production functions, with the same elasticity between high-skill and low-skill
workers,22 the proposition can be extended to a program which subsidizes the reallocation of
low-skill workers relatively more than that of high-skill workers, so that the subsidy coe¢ cients
obey sH < sL. In this case, the subsidy program is not equivalent to a shift in the transition
process, and low-skill workers who remain in sector 2 might benet from it (as high-skill workers
do not leave their sector as fast as low-skill workers). Yet, the negative impact on low-skill
workers from sector 1 outweigh the possibly positive impact on low-skill workers from sector
2.
It should be clear that, although this analysis depends crucially on the relative skill inten-
sities of the two sectors, it does not hinge on sector-specic human capital being the source
of the rigid adjustment. In a HeckscherOhlin framework, any subsidy program that succeeds
in more rapidly shifting the economys resources to the skill-intensive sector entails a general
equilibrium e¤ect that is detrimental to the welfare of low-skill workers. More generally, this
result demonstrates the importance of bearing in mind the long-term e¤ects of trade shocks
when assessing the implications of a subsidy for switching sectors. In the United States, where
trade shocks are usually considered to be detrimental to low-skill workers in the long-run, such
program might have negative distributional consequences.
20A small number of old low-skill workers who retire during the transition may benet from the program, as
wages in sector 2 may be increasing during (0;min (t1; t2)).
21 Interestingly, the logic of this analysis can be extended to a retraining program that allows workers to
transform their sector 2-human capital into sector 1-human capital up to some experience level a. In contrast
to the subsidy, the retraining program increases the present value of production. However, beneciaries from
the program themselves might lose from it since in the limit where a is large enough, the economy is identical
to the general human capital case.
22A weaker su¢ cient condition is that (1  nL)w2L   nLw1L > 0 for t1  t2 or (1  nL) v2L   nLv1L < 0
otherwise.
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Both Dix-Carneiro (2014) and Cos¸ar (2013) consider the welfare e¤ects of a similar subsidy
program in numerical models. Dix-Carneiro (2014) nds that, although a switching subsidy
reduces overall welfare by introducing distortions, it does increase the welfare of low-skill
workers. This is line with our analysis because he considers a negative price shock to high-tech
manufacturing a sector that is relatively high-skill intensive whereas we consider a shock to
the low-skillintensive sector. If we had considered a negative price shock to the skill-intensive
sector, then the analogue of Proposition 4 would likewise have carried through; we would have
found a negative e¤ect on high-skill workers and a positive e¤ect on low-skill workers, just as
Dix-Carneiro does.
Cos¸ar (2013) nds positive welfare e¤ects for two reasons. First, he does not consider the
distinction between low- and high-skill workers, so the unintended distributional consequences
at the heart of our model are absent. Second, his model features an externality whereby workers
do not capture the full social benet of their human capital. This makes workers ine¢ ciently
reluctant to accept jobs, which slows down the adjustment period following a trade shock.
This ine¢ ciency can be partly overcome by the switching subsidy, which implies an increase
in overall e¢ ciency. This rationale for a subsidy is not, however, specic to trade-displaced
workers; it applies equally to any subsidy that encourages more search, a general point that is
emphasized by Kletzer (2001).
5 Extensions
In this section we show that our results are robust to introducing an additional factor of
production, or nonpecuniary sector preferences that generate bilateral ows of workers across
sectors.
5.1 Physical capital
In this extension we allow for physical capital as a factor of production. The production
functions are now given by
Yi = Fi (Li; Hi;Ki) for i 2 f1; 2g ;
where Ki is the physical capital employed in sector i. We assume that both functions are
CRS with positive cross partial derivatives. The total amount of physical capital increases
proportionally with population. We study two di¤erent cases, one where physical capital is
entirely sector specic and one where it is fully transferable. In addition, Appendix A.4 studies
the case where capital is slowly movable between the two sectors.
An equilibrium analogous to the one studied so far still exists in both cases. In particular,
the number of workers switching sectors upon impact is second order whereas the time at which
wages are equalized is rst order. When physical capital is sector specic, the expressions
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derived in the case with no physical capital for the time t1 of adjustment (8) and for the mass
aL of low-skill workers who switch sectors (9) are still valid, and so are the expressions derived
for t2 and aH . When capital is fully transferable, these expressions become (respectively)
t1 =

1  (w1K+w2K)(r1K+r2K)
rss
wss

wss dpp + o (dp)0@ w1L + w2L   (w1K+w2K)(r1K+r2K) (r1L + r2L) (1  nL)xL (0)
+

w1H + w2H   (w1K+w2K)(r1K+r2K) (r1H + r2H)

(1  nH)xH (0)H
1A ; (13)
aL =  
xL (0)

1  (w1K+w2K)(r1K+r2K)
rss
wss

t1
2
R T
0 x
0
L () e
 d
dp
p
+ o
 
dp2

: (14)
Here rss denotes the rental rate of capital in steady state, and r1X = @
2F1
@K1@X1
and r2X =
p@2F2
@K2@X2
for X 2 fL;H;Kg are the derivatives of the rental rate of capital in each sector.
When the allocation of capital prior to the price shock is identical in the sector-specic and
fully transferable cases, comparing (8) and (13) shows that the transition time is longer when
capital is transferable. Since r1K + r2K < 0 and w1K +w2K > 0, the term in parenthesis in the
numerator of (13) is greater than 1. Moreover, as r1L + r2L; r1H + r2H > 0, the denominator
is less negative in (13). Both imply a higher t1. Comparing (9) and (14) also shows that more
low-skill workers switch sectors immediately after the trade shock (and one can similarly show
that more time is required for high-skill wages to equalize). It is intuitive that the transfer of
capital from sector 2 to sector 1 increases the marginal product of the other factors, so more
high-skill and low-skill workers need to reallocate in order to equalize wages. This directly
increases the length of the transition period and the number of low-skill workers who switch
sectors upon impact of the trade shock.23
With more inputs than goods, the strict version of the StolperSamuelson theorem (as in
Lemma 1) no longer holds. However, when physical capital is sector specic, we still get that
low-skill workers are hurt relatively more than high-skill workers when the price of good 2
decreases (wss=vss changes in the same direction as p). When physical capital is mobile, then,
if its intensity is the same in both sectors, low-skill workers lose relative to high-skill workers
when the price of good 2 decreases.
5.2 Nonpecuniary sectoral preferences
There is empirical evidence that gross ows across sectors that is, ows in both directions
between sectors in the absence of trade shocks signicantly outweigh net ows (see e.g. Davis
23Dix-Carneiro (2014) nds that the adjustment takes about the same amount of time whether physical capital
is mobile or sector specic. This case, however, involves full specialization. In an exercise with a lower price
change of 10 per cent - Web Appendix M - he nds that perfect capital mobility implies a longer transition, as
we do here.
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and Haltiwanger, 1992). In this section we augment our model with nonpecuniary sector pref-
erences that generate gross ows and show that doing so does not signicantly a¤ect our
qualitative results.
Workers of both types can be in one of three di¤erent states: biased states 1 and 2 and
a normal state 0. Workers in the biased state i receive a nonpecuniary benet b > 0 per unit
of time from working in sector i (these nonpecuniary benet may originate, for instance, from
geographical preferences if the two goods are produced in di¤erent places). We assume that
workers in state 0 move to either of the biased states according to a Poisson process at a rate
of =2 for each state; workers in a biased state (1 or 2) move to the normal state at a Poisson
rate 1=2. To keep the problem tractable, we change the specication slightly. First, workers do
not have a xed lifetime and do not discount the future, but die at the Poisson rate . Second,
workers who switch sectors lose all the sector-specic human capital accumulated so far; for
example, if a worker from sector 2 with an accumulated experience equal to a in that sector
moves to sector 1 and later moves back to sector 2 then his sector-2 human capital reverts
to nothing. There is no population growth, the ow of newborn workers is of size 1, and the
accumulation functions are such that xZ (t) e t has a nite integral over [0;1) for Z 2 fH;Lg.
We also assume that the economy is initially in a steady state in which the fraction of people in
each state (normal or biased) is the same across ages. This assumption implies that the share
of entrants in the normal state 0 is given by 1= (1 + 2) and the share in each of the biased
states by = (1 + 2). Finally, we assume that the nonpecuniary benets b are large enough
that in the equilibrium considered all workers in state 1 work in sector 1 and all workers in
state 2 work in sector 2.
In steady state, workers in the normal state choose a sector at birth and remain in that
same sector until they die or reach the biased state corresponding to the other sector. The
share of workers switching sectors per unit of time is given by = (2 (1 + 2)), so a higher 
is associated with larger gross ows. Following a small one-time, unanticipated price change,
the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 still exists but with aL and aH now referring to the
experience of the indi¤erent worker (instead of to the age, since the two can now di¤er). It
is still the case that if workers in the normal state switch they will do so only at the time of
the shock. The full solution to the problem is given in Appendix B.4. When t1 < t2, the time
until wages are equalized is given by
t1 =
wss (1 + 2)
(1  nL)xL (0) [w1L + w2L] + (1  nH)xH (0)H [w1H + w2H ]
dp
p
+ o (dp) : (15)
This expression is identical to (8) except for the term (1 + 2). The direct e¤ect of a greater
likelihood of moving from one sector to another for nonpecuniary reasons is an increase in the
transition time t1. The reason is that only workers in the normal state can respond to the
incentive of a wage di¤erential, and the share of such workers decreases with the rate  at
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which workers leave the normal state.24 This analysis also applies to the expression for t2 and
the case where t2 < t1.
When t1 < t2, the experience of the indi¤erent low-skill worker is given by
aL =   xL (0) t1R1
0 x
0
L (s)

1 +
 
1 + 42
  1
2

e 1s +

1   1 + 42  12 e 2s ds dpp + o
 
dp2

;
(16)
where 1  14 + + 12  14
 
1 + 42
 1
2 and 2  14 + + 12+ 14
 
1 + 42
 1
2 . The denominator of
this expression is decreasing in , so a higher probability of switching sectors plays a role similar
to a higher death rate (or discount rate in the previous exercise): the loss of human capital
resulting from a sector switch is less costly when the worker is likely to switch sectors again
for nonpecuniary reasons. Thus the experience of an indi¤erent worker necessarily increases in
the frequency of nonpecuniary shocks when t1 is increasing in . Overall, this exercise suggests
positive associations between larger gross ows (a large ), slower transitions (higher t1 and
t2), and more workers reallocating upon impact (greater aL and aH). Crucially, however, this
extension does not alter our conclusion that the number of workers who switch sectors due to
the price change is of second order in the price change.
In our set-up, an increase in  is associated with a larger likelihood of being in a biased
state, which leads to larger intersectoral gross ows. It is possible to dissociate the two by
assuming that workers leave a biased state at a Poisson rate =2, in which case, the share of
workers in each state is independent of  in steady-state. Equation (15) holds but replacing
(1 + 2) by 3, so that an increase in  only a¤ects the time until which wages are equalized
indirectly through its impact on nL and nH .
6 Simulations
6.1 Calibration
We supplement our analysis of a marginal price change by parameterizing the model to t
US data and then simulating the e¤ects of a non-marginal price change. For the quantitative
analysis, it is important to recognize that not all human capital is sector specic. Therefore,
in this section, we incorporate accumulation of general human capital into the model by gen-
eralizing the human capital accumulation functions to xL (a; ) and xH (a; ), both of which
are functions of a (a workers experience in her current sector) and  (her general experience).
Both xL and xH are weakly increasing in both arguments. An equilibrium analogous to the
one described previously exists and is characterized by a cuto¤ value of sector-specic human
24There are indirect e¤ects of  as well which operate through its inuence on the steady-state allocation nL
and nH of newborn workers and on the steady-state mass of workers in each sector. Typically, an increase in
 means that a larger share of entrants needs to be allocated to the larger sector so as to compensate for the
future sector switches caused by preference shocks.
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capital aL (i.e., for low-skill workers) given byZ T aL
0
w1 ()xL ( ;  + aL) e
 d =
Z T aL
0
w2 ()xL ( + aL;  + aL) e
 d ;
this equality replaces (5), with a similar expression for aH (the cuto¤ for high-skill workers).
Our previous analysis generalizes to this case.25
Before proceeding, we briey describe our calibration (see Appendix A.3 for additional
details). To identify a high-skillintensive and a low-skillintensive sectors we rank each two-
digit-SIC US manufacturing industry by the share of its total wage bill accruing to college-
educated workers (which we identify as high-skill workers) based on data from EU KLEMS
(March 2008 release) for 2000. We dene the industries with the highest wage bill share for
high-skill workers as sector 1 and those with the lowest share as sector 2; the cuto¤ is chosen
so that the two sectors generate approximately the same value added. The gross output of
sector 1 is $2.27 trillion (US) with an average wage bill share of 0.49 for high-skill workers,
while the total output of sector 2 is $2.19 trillion with an average high-skill wage bill share of
0.24. We obtain the ratio of high-skill workers to low-skill workers ( H) from the same data.
First, to remain close to the theory, we calibrate the initial model without physical cap-
ital. However, with no long-run source of rigidity and since the di¤erence in skill intensity
between the two sectors is limited, this model (or a version with general physical capital)
would predict a counterfactually large amount of labor reallocation following moderate price-
shocks, quickly leading to full specialization. Therefore to study price shocks of 10 or 20
percents, we also calibrate a version with sector-specic physical capital. The production func-
tions are assumed to be CES between low-skill and high-skill workers in both sectors with
the same elasticity of substitution but di¤erent factor intensities, and, when present, physi-
cal capital is combined with the labor aggregate using a Cobb-Douglas aggregator, that is F1 =
A1K
1
1

1H
 1

1 + (1  1)L
 1

1
 
 1 (1 1)
and F2 = A2K
2
2

2H
 1

2 + (1  2)L
 1

2
 
 1 (1 2)
,
with 1 > 2 since we have assumed that sector 1 is high-skill intensive, and i denotes the
capital share in production (0 in the baseline model). Without loss of generality, we normalize
A1 such that A1 (K1 (0))
1 = 1, assume that the total capital stock at time 0 is equal to 2 and
imposes that the rental rates of capital are equal at time 0 between the two sectors. We choose
 = 2, which is in the range of commonly estimated values for the elasticity of substitution
between high-skill and low-skill workers in the United States (for instance, Card and Lemieux,
25The analytical expressions given in (8) and (9) for the time until the wages of low-skill workers are equalized
again (at t1) and for the sector-specic human capital of the indi¤erent worker (aL) must be updated as follows:
t1 =
wss
(1  nL)xL (0; 0) [w1L + w2L] + (1  nH)xH (0; 0)H [w1H + w2H ]
dp
p
+ o (dp) ;
aL =   xL (0; 0) t1
2
R T
0
e  @xL
@a
( ; ) d
dp
p
+ o
 
dp2

:
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2001, estimate an elasticity of substitution between 2 and 2.5 for the US and the UK for men
only and between 1.1 and 1.6 when men and women are combined).
We assume that the ow utility function is CobbDouglas, u (C1; C2) = C1C
1 
2 , and dene
a unit of good as what can be purchased for $1 trillion dollar in each sector (therefore p = 1
initially). We identify  from the ratio of these two goodsconsumption (we derive consumption
in each sector by combining output data in EU KLEMS with trade data for 2000 by SIC from
Schott, 2010). A unit of time corresponds to a year, and we x T (the length of a lifetime of
work) to be 40 years. Finally, we set the discount rate  = 0:05 and the growth rate  = 0:02.
For the human capital accumulation functions, we assume that xL (a; ) and xH (a; ) are
proportional to each other; we base our parameterization on Neal (1995), who estimates wages
both for displaced workers who stay in the same industry and for those who switch industries
based on worker experience and tenure. More specically, we assume that
xZ (a; ) = xZ0 exp

'a min (a;ma) + 'a2 min (a;ma)
2 + ' min (;m) + '2 min (;m)
2

for Z 2 fL;Hg ;
(17)
where 'a, 'a2 , ' and '2 are obtained using Neal (1995)s regressions as described in the
Appendix. ma is the sector-specic experience level for which 'aa+ 'a2a
2 is maximized (and
similarly for m), so that we atten the accumulation functions once they reach their maxima.
This denes the accumulation functions up to the constants xL0 and xH0.
To derive 1, 2, 1, 2, A2K2 (0)
2 , xL (0; 0), and xH (0; 0), we use the following moments
and constraints: the share of capital costs in the sum of capital and labor costs for both sectors
(only in the case with capital), the share of labor costs associated with high-skill workers in
the total labor costs for both sectors, the share of high-skill and of low-skill workers in sector
1 (both from EU-KLEMS), the output in each sector, and the constraints of wage equality
for both high-skill and low-skill workers. There are ten moments and constraints for nine
unknowns (the parameters plus the initial values for nL and nH), so we choose the parameters
that come closest to fullling the constraints as measured by an equally weighted distance
function (there are 8 moments for 7 unknowns in the case with no capital). Table 1 reports
the parameters.
Parameters     H 'a 'a2 ' '2
Both cases 0:02 0:05 0:5087 2 0:286 0:03  0:0007 0:027  0:0007
Parameters 1 2 xL0 xH0 A1 A2 1 2
Baseline 0:705 0:5779 0:2537 0:0878 1 0:7089 0 0
With capital 0:5952 0:4567 0:3262 0:2985 0:9705 0:8222 0:3678 0:3212
Table 1: Parameters
6.2 Simulation results without physical capital
We simulate a trade shock by considering a 1 percent price drop in sector 2. The transition path
is illustrated in Figure 3. Upon impact, low-skill and high-skill workers (respectively) younger
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Figure 3: Simulated Transition After Trade Shock. Case with no capital, 1 percent price drop
in sector 2.
than 0:041 and 0:27 years move from sector 2 to sector 1. Since only few workers switch and
since these workers have hardly any sector-specic human capital, the initial loss of low-skill
(respectively high-skill) human capital in sector 2 is only 0:1 (respectively 0:62) percent and
the gain in sector 1 is only 0:14 (respectively 0:3) percent; the total loss in human capital of
either type is even smaller (less then a hundredth of a percent). Because of this minuscule
amount of immediate reallocation, wage changes are initially sector-dependent, as illustrated
in Figure 3.A. New incoming generations will all enter sector 1 (as can be seen in Figure 3.C)
and human capital in this sector grows as shown in Figure 3.B. Low-skill wages are equalized
after 2:11 years and high-skill wages after 7:4 years. Eventually, the total stock of human
capital in sector 1 will have increased by 18:6 and 9:3 percent for (respectively) low-skill and
high-skill workers. As predicted by our approximation method, the initial adjustments share
of total labor reallocation for low-skill workers, L, is quite small: 0:74 percent and similarly
H is equal to 3:16 percent, which, in return, explains why the transition is so protracted.
Figure 3.D studies the evolution of the skill premium, both within sector and at the aggre-
gate level. The skill premium here is dened as the average pay of a low-skill worker divided
by the average pay of a high-skill worker (not controlling for industry-tenure or age). The
evolution at the aggregate level follows exactly the analysis in section 4.1: the wage premium
increases on impact as the price shocks negatively a¤ects the low-skill intensive sector and
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then keeps increasing smoothly to its steady-state value. More surprising is the behavior of
the within sector skill-premium. In sector 1, the skill premium increases quickly as initially all
incoming generations enter sector 1 (so that the ratio of low-skill human capital over high-skill
human capital increases). When low-skill workers start entering sector 2, the skill premium
keeps increasing but slower (as the generations with a high ratio of low-skill over high-skill
workers accumulate more human capital). The skill premium overshoots its steady-state value
(which is equal to the aggregate value) and starts declining once high-skill workers enter both
sectors. In sector 2, the skill premium initially jumps as more high-skill workers leave the sec-
tor than low-skill ones do, it stays essentially at until t1, and increases sharply thereafter, as
only low-skill workers restart entering sector 2. It also overshoots its steady-state value. The
gure demonstrates that the full impact on wage premia from changing producer prices is only
reached after several years. This is consistent with the ndings of Robertson (2004) and sug-
gests that it might be di¢ cult to nd Stolper-Samuelson e¤ects when using contemporaneous
changes in wages and producer-prices.
We investigate numerically how the speed of human capital accumulation a¤ects the tran-
sition by using the accumulation functions exZ (a; ) = xZ (a=2; =2), so that specic human
capital is accumulated half as fast as in the baseline scenario. As previously discussed, we in-
deed nd that the transition is slightly shorter: it takes 2 years for low-skill wages to equalize
(instead of 2:11) and 7:24 years (instead of 7:4) for high-skill wages. More workers switch sec-
tors on impact namely, low-skill workers whose age is less than 0:053 (instead of 0:041) and
high-skill workers whose age is less than 0:32 (instead of 0:27). The discount rate is su¢ ciently
large to ensure that, in the long-run, the smaller cost of switching dominates the impact of a
shorter period of wage di¤erences on the number of workers switching sectors.
Next we turn to the welfare implications. Because the immediate wage impact is tied to
sector of employment, the oldest workers in sector 1 gain from the drop in sector 2-prices; in
contrast, the e¤ect of a trade shock on the youngest workers will be dominated by standard
HOS e¤ects in the long run. Figure 4 shows the welfare gains from trade liberalization for
low-skill workers for each generation alive at t = 0, in the aggregate and for each initial
sector of employment, it also shows the welfare gains in the alternative case where human
capital is general (so that welfare is the same regardless of the initial sector of employment).
Welfare gains are expressed according to the equivalent variation measure in percentage gains
in consumption (that is the gure displays for each type of worker the percentage change of
consumption without the trade shock which yields the same welfare as the trade shock). The
gradual reallocation of factors towards the skill-intensive sector means that the youngest low-
skill workers lose the most from the trade liberalization. In addition, although all low-skill
workers are better-o¤ than they would have been in a fully exible world, only the oldest
low-skill workers in sector 1 benet from the trade shock. A corresponding graph for high-skill
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Figure 4: Welfare gains (in percentage of consumption) to low-skill workers, by age, who are
alive at time 0. Case with no capital, 1 percent price drop in sector 2.
workers would demonstrate that, although all high-skill workers are worse-o¤ than they would
be in a world of complete capital mobility, only the oldest high-skill workers in sector 2 are
hurt by the trade shock.
We examine the e¤ects of a subsidy program (as in Section 4.3) that taxes high-skill workers
to subsidize all workers who switch sector. We do indeed nd that this program reduces the
aggregate income of all low-skill workers alive at t = 0. For instance if the ratio s between
the subsidy and the pay of a new worker is equal to 10%, the payment of the subsidy itself
represents a direct transfer from high-skill to low-skill workers equivalent to 0:006 percent of the
lifetime income of all low-skill workers (alive at t = 0). Yet, the negative general equilibrium
e¤ect is su¢ ciently large, that overall the loss for low-skill workers alive at t = 0 is equal to
0:028 percent of their lifetime income.
Finally, to illustrate the accuracy of our approximation technique, Figure 5.A shows the
numerically computed values for t1, t2, aL, and aH and compares them to the values obtained
with the Taylor approximations for di¤erent price changes. In all cases, an equilibrium of the
type described in Proposition 1 exists. The approximation does quite well for aL, t1, and aH :
For t2, the t worsens signicantly as the price change increases and t2 becomes a relatively
large number. As shown in Figure 5.B, the initial share of adjustment increases with the
size of the price change, but all along, the adjustment largely occurs through the incoming
generations. As already discussed, this version of the model predicts large labor reallocations
even for small price changes, and the t worsens signicantly from 2:5 percent. The economy
specializes quickly (it is specialized at 10 percent), and at that point an equilibrium of the type
described in Proposition 1 ceases to exist.
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Figure 5: Times until wage equalization, ages of indi¤erent workers, and shares of reallocation
on impact for di¤erent price changes (simulation results and approximation results). Case
without physical capital.
6.3 Simulation results with sector-specic physical capital
We now turn to the case with sector-specic physical capital. With sector-specic physical
capital, the model predicts much less reallocation so that with a 1 percent price shock, the
times until wages are equalized are given by t1 = 0:45 and t2 = 0:79 while the ages of the
indi¤erent workers are aL = 0:01 for low-skill and aH = 0:017 for high-skill. We focus on a 10
percent price drop in sector 2. An equilibrium of the type described by Proposition 1 exists. As
described below, the qualitative features are similar to the baseline model, the major di¤erence
being that the Stolper-Samuelson theorem does not apply.
The transition path is illustrated in Figure 6. Figure 6.A looks similar to Figure 3.A (we
omit the panels on the allocation of human capital, the allocation of entering generations and
on the skill premium as they look similar26). We nd that low-skill and high-skill workers
(respectively) younger than 0:64 and 1:12 years move from sector 2 to sector 1. Low-skill
wages are equalized after 4:01 years and high-skill wages after 6:21 years. Therefore, most of
the adjustment happens through the entry of new generations since the initial adjustments
shares L and H are equal to 12:3 and 13:7 percents respectively.27
26Although in sector 1 the skill premium now decreases between t1 and t2 because the mass of low-skill workers
entering sector 1 is quite low.
27One can show that for marginal price changes a slower accumulation of human capital leads to a slower
transition when xL and xH are proportional and physical capital enters the production functions in a Cobb-
Douglas way with the same share in both sectors. In our calibrations, the shares are quite close, and therefore
we still nd that if human capital is accumulated half as fast, t1 and t2 decrease to 3:72 and 5:95 years (aL and
aH increase to 0:73 and 1:27).
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Figure 6: Simulated Transition After Trade Shock. Case with sector-specic physical capital,
10 percent price drop in sector 2.
As already mentioned, a major di¤erence with Figure 3.A is that the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem no longer applies. High-skill wages still increase relatively more from the price change
than low-skill wages; but here, steady-state high-skill wages are lower in nominal terms after
the price shock and nominal low-skill wages decrease less than the price of good 2. Low-skill
wages in sector 2 drop on impact with the price shock. Then, up to t1, incoming generations
enter sector 1, and some low-skill and high-skill workers employed in sector 2 retire, as a result,
low-skill wages increase in sector 2 as the ratio of physical capital per low-skill workers increases.
Between t1 and t2, low-skill workers start reentering sector 2, but not high-skill workers, the
wage of low-skill workers drops but not enough to compensate the increase between t1 and
t2. After t2, workers of both types enter both sectors and wages are roughly constant. This
di¤erent dynamic for wages has important welfare consequences. As shown in Figure 6.B, older
low-skill workers in sector 2 lose more than younger ones, and in fact they would be better
o¤ if human capital were general instead of sector-specic (however, aggregating sector 1 and
sector 2, each generation of low-skill worker still loses relative to the general human capital
case).28
As before, we compare the theoretical results with the numerical ones by studying price
changes of 5, 10, 15 and 20 percent. Contrary to the cases with no or general physical capital,
an equilibrium with the characteristics of Proposition 1 exists even for a 20 percent price
change (as the new steady-state does not feature full specialization). Figure 7.A shows that
the approximation does very well for a 5 percent price change, but the t worsens for t2 and
aH for price changes above 15 percent. In Appendix B.5 we shows that, in this case, extending
28For the parameter values considered, a subsidy as in Section 4.3, does not decrease the aggregate income of
low-skill workers as the negative general equilibrium e¤ect is not strong enough to overturn the positive transfer
from high-skill to low-skill.
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Figure 7: Times until wage equalization, ages of indi¤erent workers, and shares of reallocation
on impact for di¤erent price changes (simulation results and approximation results). Case with
sector-specic physical capital.
our approximation technique to include one additional order can signicantly improve the
precision of the analytical approximations. As before, the share of labor reallocation occurring
on impact still increases with the size of the price change (equation 10 still holds). Nevertheless,
Figure 7.B show that even at 20 percent, the adjustment mostly occurs through the incoming
generations (L and H are equal to 21:3 and 23:9 percent respectively). Therefore, even
though at large price changes, the gap between the values given by the approximation method
and the actual values increases, the shape of the equilibrium is conserved, and so are the
insights brought about by our analysis.
A drawback of this specication is that the allocation of new investment is exogenous and
constant, even though the interest rates are permanently di¤erent in both sectors (we assumed
that the capital stock was growing at the same rate as the population, which is why new invest-
ments take place). To address this concern, Appendix A.4 presents an extension of the model
where in each sector a fraction of capital is fully sector specic (this may represent physical
capital but also natural resources or workers with a very strong link to a particular sector)
while the rest of capital is slowly transferable (installed capital is xed but new investments
are fully mobile). Quantitatively, the quality of the approximation for aH and t2 worsens for
large price changes as the share of slowly transferable capital increases. Yet, qualitatively the
results are similar as long as the new steady-state does not feature full specialization and the
population growth rate  is large enough.29 The youngest workers are reallocated on impact,
29As specied in footnote 9, a su¢ ciently large  is necessary to ensure that at the time where the switchers
die, the drop in the mass of workers in sector 1 is not too large. For a large price change, where the share of
workers allocated to sector 1 is very large, a  > 0:02 may be necessary. The equilibrium is more likely to break
down if the new steady-state features full specialization (which can only occur asymptotically and when there
31
while the majority of the reallocation happens through incoming generations. After a period
where wages are higher in sector 1 (with new workers all entering sector 1), wages get equalized
and new workers start entering both sectors.
7 Conclusion
The mobility of factors is crucial for understanding the welfare e¤ects of trade shocks. This pa-
per adds sector-specic human capital to an otherwise classic dynamic HOS model. Our model
replicates the standard HOS model in steady state but it di¤ers during the transitional phase.
In particular, our model endogenously generate (i) low levels of worker reallocation immedi-
ately after a trade shock and (ii) a protracted period of adjustment before wages reequilibrate.
The model replicates previous empirical ndings that mostly young people switch sectors, that
most of the adjustment happens through the entry of new generations, and that wages after
the shock are tied to sector and not to skill type. We also show that the models qualitative
predictions are unaltered by the inclusion of either general human capital, physical capital or
gross ows from nonpecuniary sectoral preferences.
Moreover, the model delivers some surprising results: a faster accumulation of human
capital can make the transition longer and low-skill workers benet from rigid labor markets
when the low-skillintensive sector is hit by a negative price shock. This last point is crucial for
assessing the welfare e¤ects of a subsidy for switching sectors. Although such a moving subsidy
directly benets the low-skill workers who receive it, the subsequent faster reallocation of
resources to the high-skillintensive sector hurts low-skill workers as a group. For a wide range
of parameter values, this latter e¤ect dominates. The intuitions of the model are illustrated
with a calibration, which reveals that an equilibrium with the same structure still exists and
that the approximation methods are accurate for discrete price changes. The calibration shows
in particular that the initial adjustments share in total labor reallocation is small, which
explains why the transition is protracted. The quantitative predictions of the approximation
method do, however, worsen when the trade shocks leads to large labor reallocation in the
long-run.
This paper employs the analytical approach of extending a classic trade model to analyze
the interaction between labor market rigidities and international trade; it therefore comple-
ments the literature that studies similar questions using estimated and numerically solved
models. The analytical approach has several virtues: it allows for greater generality, it pro-
vides linkages to well-understood models in trade, and it is easy to extend. These advantages
open up several paths for future research. For instance, one could add rms and rm-specic
human capital (or occupations and occupation-specic capital) to the model as a means for
assessing the importance of the type of human capital specicity. Such models might build on
is no fully sector-specic capital) as then the share of incoming workers allocated to sector 1 must be close to 1.
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the literature that addresses rm heterogeneity and the intraindustry reallocations triggered
by trade liberalization and perhaps could illuminate why little interindustry labor reallocation
is observed in the short run despite substantial intraindustry reallocations.
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A Appendix
A.1 Existence of the equilibrium
This section proves Propositions 1 and 2. First we derive the times until equalization of high-
skill wages and of low-skill wages as well as the ages of the indi¤erent high-skill and low-skill
worker (t1, t2, aH , and aL, respectively) in an equilibrium which has the structure described
in Proposition 1. Second, we show that workers switch sectors only at time 0. In the online
Appendix B, we show that for  su¢ ciently large, it is possible to keep wages equalized forever
once they have been equalized once; and we show that the equilibrium maximizes the present
value of production.
A.1.1 Ages of the indi¤erent workers and times until wage equalization
Equations (5) and (6) pin down the indi¤erent workers. For a marginal price change, the
di¤erence between w1 and w2 is at most rst order,30 and workers whose age is nonmarginal
will not switch sector (for these workers, w1 ()xL ()<w2 ()xL (a+ )). Hence only the
workers whose age is at most rst order in the price change may be willing to move. We can
therefore take a rst-order expansion of (5) with respect to (aL; w1 (t) ; w2 (t)) around aL = 0
and w1 (t) = w2 (t) = wss and then simplify to obtain
aL =
R t1
0 (dw1 ()  dw2 ())xL () e d
wss
R T
0 x
0
L () e
 d
+ o (t1dp) ; (A.1)
where dwi (t)  wi (t)  wss and analogous denitions are used for high-skill wages. Since t1
and dwi (t) will both be of at most rst order in dp, it follows that aL is at most second order.
An analogous expression holds for aH .
Now dene gH (t)  dv1 (t)   dv2 (t) and gL (t)  dw1 (t)   dw2 (t) such that t1 (resp. t2)
denotes the lowest t for which gL (t1) = 0 (resp. gH (t2) = 0). Dene dli (t) = li (t)  lss. Given
that aL is at most second order, one can di¤erentiate equation (7) and an analogous expression
for l2 to obtain:
dl1 (t) =  dl2 (t) = (1  nL)xL (0) t+ o (dp) for 0  t  t1, t2; (A.2)
similarly,
dh1 (t) =  dh2 (t) = (1  nH)xH (0)Ht+ o (dp) for 0  t  t1; t2: (A.3)
Taking a rst-order expansion of gH (t) around dp = 0 and then using equations (A.2) and
(A.3), we nd that
gH (t) = t

(v1L + v2L) (1  nL)xL (0) + (v1H + v2H) (1  nH)xHH (0)
 vss
p
dp+o (dp) for 0  t  t1; t2;
30An economic variable that is "at most nth order" in the price change is one that can be of order mth for
m  n.
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where viZ =
@vi
@Z at the steady-state value (prior to the price change), and similarly that
gL (t) = t

(w1H + w2H) (1  nH)xH (0)H + (w1L + w2L) (1  nL)xL (0)
 wss
p
dp+o (dp) for 0  t  t1; t2;
where wiZ =
@wi
@Z . Since both F1 and F2 are CRS, it follows that (v1L + v2L) (1  nL)xL (0) +
(v1H + v2H) (1  nH)xH (0)H or (w1H + w2H) (1  nH)xH (0)H+(w1L + w2L) (1  nL)xL (0)
(or both) must be strictly negative.31 Consider the case where
1
vss
 
(v1L + v2L) (1  nL)xL (0) + (v1H + v2H) (1  nH)xH (0)H

(A.4)
>
1
wss
 
(w1H + w2H) (1  nH)xH (0)H + (w1L + w2L) (1  nL)xL (0)

;
which implies (w1H + w2H) (1  nH)xH (0)H + (w1L + w2L) (1  nL)xL (0) < 0.32 Then gL is
positive but decreases over time until t1 > 0; over the same time period, gH remains strictly
positive (and may increase or decrease). Therefore, if (A.4) holds then wages are equalized for
low-skill workers rst: t1 < t2. The Appendix focuses on this case; if t1 > t2 then symmetric
expressions would obtain.
For t 2 (t1; t2), low-skill workers are allocated such that their wages are equalized across
sectors but (A.3) still holds. At rst order, dl1+dl2 = 0+o (dp) because the number of low-skill
workers who switch is of second order at most; therefore, dw1 = dw2 implies that
dl1 (t) =  w1H + w2H
w1L + w2L
(1  nH)xH (0)Ht+ w
ss
w1L + w2L
dp
p
+ o (dp) for t1  t  t2: (A.5)
Using this equation and (A.3), we can write gH (t) as
gH (t) =

v1H + v2H   (v1L + v2L) (w1H + w2H)
w1L + w2L

(1  nH)xH (0)Ht+

v1L + v2L
w1L + w2L
wss   vss

dp
p
+o (dp) ;
for t1  t  t2, which is decreasing in t (using the properties of CRS functions) and positive
when (A.4) holds. Hence t2 is dened by
t2 =
vss   v1L+v2Lw1L+w2Lwss
(1  nH)xH (0)H

v1H + v2H   (v1L+v2L)(w1H+w2H)w1L+w2L
 dp
p
+ o (dp) : (A.6)
31Assume that this is not the case then both
(F1LH + pF2LH) (1  nL)xL (0)    (F1HH + pF2HH) (1  nH)xH (0)H
and
(F1LH + pF2H) (1  nH)xH (0)H    (F1LL + pF2LL) (1  nL)xL (0) ;
with strict inequality for at least one of the two expressions. This implies, since F1 and F2 are CRS, that
F1HHF2LL+F2HHF1LL
F1LHF2LH
< 2. However the properties of CRS functions dictate that F1HHF2LL+F2HHF1LL
F1LHF2LH
=
H2
L2
L1
H1
+ L2
H2
H1
L1
, which is strictly greater than 2 if F1 and F2 have di¤erent factor intensities.
32We rule out the case where (A.4) holds with equality. The same logic would apply, but then t1 and t2 would
di¤er only at second order.
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Using (A.2), (A.3), and that dw1 = dw2 for t > t1, we can rewrite (A.1) as (9). Since
dw1 > dw2 on (0; t1) and dw1 = dw2 from t1, the only low-skill workers who switch from sector
2 are those who are younger than aL. In an analogous manner we can use (A.2), (A.3), (A.5),
and the counterpart of (A.1) for high-skill workers to solve for aH as follows:
aH =   xH (0)
2
R T
0 x
0
H () e
 d
dp
p

t2   w
ss (v1L + v2L)
vss (w1L + w2L)
(t2   t1)

: (A.7)
Similarly, the only high-skill workers who switch from sector 2 are those who are younger than
aH .
Note that, in the opposite case where wages of high-skill workers are equalized rst (t1 > t2),
one can analogously derive the following expressions:
t1 =
wss   w1H+w2Hv1H+v2H vss
(1  nL)xL (0)

w1L + w2L   (w1H + w2H) v1L+v2Lv1H+v2H
 dp
p
+ o (dp) ;
t2 =
vss
(1  nL)xL (0) [v1L + v2L] + (1  nH)xH (0)H [v1H + v2H ]
dp
p
+ o (dp) ;
aL =   xL (0)
2
R T
0 x
0
L () e
 d
dp
p

t1   v
ss (w1H + w2H)
wss (v1H + v2H)
(t1   t2)

+ o
 
dp2

;
aH =   xH (0) t2
2
R T
0 e
 x0H () d
dp
p
+ o
 
dp2

:
To establish that Proposition 1 describes an equilibrium, we must still show that (i) workers
will switch sectors only once and only time t = 0, and (ii) after t1 (resp. t2) it is always possible
to adjust the ow of entrants such that wages of low-skill (resp. high-skill) workers remain
equalized. We focus on low-skill workers below in what follows but the same reasoning applies
as well to high-skill workers.
A.1.2 Workers switch only once
We begin by noting that low-skill workers who enter sector 1 will never switch because this
sector always has wages that are weakly higher than those of sector 2. Furthermore, workers
will not switch after time t1 because then wages are equalized; workers will always remain in
the sector where they have accumulated the most experience until time t1. Therefore, the only
workers who may switch are those born before t = 0 who entered sector 2, and they may switch
only during the time period [0; t1]. Let us consider such a worker. We denote her age by a, the
time she spends in sector 1 during the time period [0; t1] by 1, and the time spent in sector
2 during that same time period by 2 = t1   1. We seek to show that if such a worker were
to stick to the same sector during the time period (0; t1], she would be better-o¤.
First consider the case where, at time t1, the total experience accumulated in sector 1 is
weakly greater than the total experience accumulated in sector 2, that is 1  2 + a (which
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implies that a is at most of rst order since t1 is rst order). Therefore from time t1 onward,
this worker would (weakly) prefer working in sector 1. We compare the welfare of this worker
under this strategy to her welfare under the alternative strategy where she switches to sector
1 at time 0 (when the trade shock hits). During the time interval [0; t1], the worker benets
from a higher wage under the alternative strategy for periods where she works in sector 2 in
the original strategy, but she su¤ers from a lower level of human capital. The loss in human
capital is bounded above by xL (2 + a)   xL (0), and it is su¤ered during a time period of
length 2; hence this loss is at most of the same order as (2 + a)2. For periods where she
works in sector 1 in the original strategy, she benets from a higher level of human capital
under the alternative strategy. The gain is equal to xL ()  xL (   2). This gain is endured
for a nonnegligible period of time and so is of the same order as 2. Hence the gain is of a
higher order than the lower, and this worker would be better-o¤ switching to sector 1 upon
impact.
Now consider the opposite case where 1 < 2 + a (at time t1 the total experience ac-
cumulated in sector 1 is smaller than the total experience accumulated in sector 2) and the
alternative strategy where the worker stays in sector 2 forever. During the time interval [0; t1],
when the worker is employed in sector 1 under the original strategy, she su¤ers from a lower
wage in the alternative strategy; the resulting welfare loss is at most of the same order as 1dp.
For time periods where she works in sector 2 in the original strategy, she benets from a higher
level of human capital under the alternative strategy. In particular, from period t1 onward,
her human capital is higher by xL ( + a)   xL ( + a  1). This gain lasts a nonnegligible
period of time, so that the welfare gain is of the same order as 1. In this case, then, the gains
are larger than the losses and so the worker is better-o¤ under the alternative strategy, staying
in sector 2 all along. This establishes point (i).
In Appendix B.1.1, we show that nL (t) and nH (t) are in (0; 1) for  su¢ ciently large,
which achieves the proof of existence of the equilibrium.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
The argument is most easily made with reference to Figure 1. Along the transition path,
wages in sector 1 must remain weakly higher than wages in sector 2 (w1 (t)  w2 (t) and
v1 (t)  v2 (t)). From the gure it follows that w1 (t) ; w2 (t)  wss0 and v2 (t) ; v1 (t)  vss0;
therefore, any low-skill worker who does not switch industries (and so does not lose any human
capital) will benet from the rigidity engendered by sector-specic human capital.
Consider, moreover, a low-skill worker of t^  aL who switches from sector 2 to sector 1.
The lifetime income of this worker obeysZ T t^
0
w1 ()xL () e
 d 
Z T t^
0
w2 ()xL
 
t^+ 

e d 
Z T t^
0
wss0xL
 
t^+ 

e d:
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Here the rst inequality follows from equation (5) and the second from w1 (t)  wss0. Since
lifetime income is higher under the rigid regime yet prices are the same, even those workers
who switch are better-o¤. An analogous argument demonstrates that all high-skill workers
would be better-o¤ if human capital were not sector-specic.
A.3 Calibration details
In this appendix we provide some details on our calibration: the list of industries in each
group, how we parameterize the accumulation function from Neal (1995), and how we derive
the parameters 1, 2, 1, 2, A2, xL (0; 0), and xH (0; 0).
As described in the main text, we split the 2-digit industries from EU KLEMS for 2000
into a high-skill group and a low-skill group of equal value-added size. High skill is dened
as college graduate or above, and low skillis dened as some college or below (i.e., the sum
of low and medium skills in the EU KLEMSs US classication). The high-skill industries in
decreasing order of their wage bill devoted to high-skill workers are: o¢ ce, accounting and
computing machinery; medical, precision, and optical instruments; chemicals and chemical
products; transport equipment; printing, publishing and reproduction, electrical engineering;
and coke, rened petroleum, and nuclear fuel. The low-skill industries (in decreasing order of
the wage bill share of high-skill workers) are tobacco; manufacturing not otherwise classied;
food and beverage; pulp and paper; machinery not otherwise classied; textiles; rubber and
plastics; nonmetallic minerals; basic metals; fabricated metal; wood; and leather and footwear.
The high-skill wage bill share for the cuto¤ industries are 40.2% and 34.4%.
We base our estimate for the human capital accumulation function on columns 2 and 3
of Table 4 in Neal (1995). Neal regresses the log wage of displaced workers on experience
(pre-displacement), experience squared, tenure (in the rm prior to the displacement), and
tenure squared (plus a constant and some control variables that include education). He runs
this regression separately for displaced workers who switch 2-digit industries and for displaced
workers who stay in the same 2-digit industry. We reproduce the coe¢ cients of interest from
his table below (specifying notation in parenthesis).
The Relationship between Wages and Job Tenure: Men (Neal, 1995)
Log Postdisplacement Wage
Switchers Stayers
Experience (predisplacement) 0.016 (ae) 0.027 (
s
e)
Experience2 -0.0003 (ae2) -0.0004 (
s
e2)
Tenure (predisplacement) 0.011 (at ) 0.030 (
s
t )
Tenure2 -0.0004 (at2) -0.0010 (
s
t2)
Since our model does not distinguish between experience in a sector and experience in a specic
rm in a given sector, we add up the coe¢ cients for experience and tenure. Then we identify
the coe¢ cient for switchers as the impact of general human capital on wages, and identify the
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di¤erence between the coe¢ cients for stayers and switchers as the e¤ect of sector-specic human
capital on wages. Following the specication of this regression, we posit capital accumulation
functions of the form given by (17). We obtain
'a  se + st   (ae + at ) = 0:03;
'a2  se2 + st2  
 
ae2 + 
a
t2

=  0:0007;
'  ae + at = 0:027;
'2  ae2 + at2 =  0:0007;
ma = 21:42;
m = 19:28:
In this specication, nearly half of total human capital is sector specic.
We nd that the consumption share for sector 1 is given by  = 0:5087 and that H = 0:286:
The capital shares are empirically given by b1 = 0:358 in sector 1 and b2 = 0:329 in sector.
The empirical estimate for the wage bill in sector 1 is given by c1 = 0:487 and in sector 2 byc2 = 0:242. The estimates for output where one unit of good in each sector corresponds to $1
trillion of output in the data are cY1 = 2:275 and cY2 = 2:194 in sectors 1 and 2, respectively.
The estimates of the share of high-skill and low-skill workers are cnH = 0:618 and cnL = 0:341.
Let FL 
R 40
0 e
 t xL(t;t)
xL0
dt and FH 
R 40
0 e
 t xH(t;t)
xH0
dt (therefore FL = FH). Then we can
express steady-state (that is, time 0) output in the model as:
Y1 =

1
 
nHxH0HFH
 1
 + (1  1) (nLxL0FL)
 1

 
 1 (1 1)
;
Y2 = eA22  (1  nH)xH0HFH 1 + (1  2) ((1  nL)xL0FL) 1   1 (1 2) ;
where nH and nL denote the endogenous steady-state allocations of workers of each type in
sector 1 and eA2 = A2 (K2 (0))2 . Moreover, wage equalization in both sectors imposes that
CH

1 (1  1)
 
nHxH0HFH
  1

 
1
 
nHxH0HFH
 1

+ (1  1) (nLxL0FL)
 1

!(1 1)
 1  1
2 (1  2) eA2  (1  nH)xH0HFH  1
 
2
 
(1  nH)xH0HFH
 1

+ (1  2) ((1  nL)xL0FL)
 1

! (1 2)
 1  1
  1
= 0;
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CL

(1  1) (1  1) (nLxL0FL) 
1

 
1
 
nHxH0HFH
 1

+ (1  1) (nLxL0FL)
 1

!(1 1)
 1  1
(1  2) (1  2) eA2 ((1  nL)xL0FL)  1
 
2
 
(1  nH)xH0HFH
 1

+ (1  2) ((1  nL)xL0FL)
 1

! (1 2)
 1  1
  1
= 0:
For the version with no capital, we impose 1 = 2 = 0 and we pin down the parameters
1, 2, xL0, xH0, and A2 = eA2 by solving for
min
1;2;xL0;xH0;nL;nH ;A2
M0 (1; 2; xL0; xH0; nL; nH ; A2) ;
where M0 is the following distance function:
M0  (1  c1)2+(2  c2)2+(nH   cnH)2+(nL   cnL)2+Y1cY1   1
2
+

Y2cY2   1
2
+C2H+C
2
L.
This results in:
1 = 0:705; 2 = 0:5779; xL0 = 0:2537; xH0 = 0:0878 and A2 = 0:7089:
With these parameters, the model predicts a steady-state allocation of nH = 0:68 and nL =
0:41
In the presence of sector-specic capital, we pin down the parameters 1, 2, 1; 2, xL0,
xH0, and eA2 by solving for
min
1;2;1;2;xL0;xH0;nL;nH ;A2
M (1; 2; 1; 2; xL0; xH0; nL; nH ; A2) ;
where M is the distance function:
M M0 +

1  c12 + 2  c22
We thus obtain the following parameters:
1 = 0:5952; 2 = 0:4567; xL0 = 0:3262; xH0 = 0:2985; eA2 = 0:7991; 1 = 0:3678 and 2 = 0:3212
With these parameters, the model predicts a steady-state allocation of nH = 0:66 and nL =
0:39. We then use the value of eA2, the normalization A1K1 (0)1 = 1, the assumption that the
total capital stock at t = 0 is equal to 2 and the equality in the rental rate of capital to derive
A1 = 0:9705 and A2 = 0:8222.
Note that since the system is overidentied, one cannot pinpoint exactly which moment
determines which parameter. Yet, the capital shares in the data are directly linked to the
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i coe¢ cients, the high-skill cost shares depend on the coe¢ cient i as well as the ratio of
low-skill to high-skill human capital in the sector (that is nHxH0H=nLxL0 in sector 1 and
(1  nH)xH0H= (1  nL)xL0 in sector 2). The output levels depend on the low-skill and high-
skill steady-state allocations (nL; nH), as well as on the levels of human capital xH0 and xL0,
the capital shares i and the productivity coe¢ cient eA2. The constraints that wages must be
equalized and that the steady-state allocations must be close to the ones observed in the data
further constrain the values for 1; 2; 1; 2; xL0; xH0 and eA2.
A.4 Slowly transferable capital
A.4.1 Analytical results
We now assume that while old capital cannot move, new investments can be freely allocated
between the two sectors. We denote by  the depreciation rate of capital, and since we assume
a constant capital - labor ratio (at the level of the economy), the exogenous total investment
ow must be given by I (t) = ( + ) etK0 (with K0  K (0)). As a result the normalized
stock of capital in sector 1 obeys

k1 (t) = ( + ) (nI (t)K0   k1 (t)) ;
where nI is the share of investment going to sector 1. Similarly, the normalized stock of capital
in sector 2 obeys

k2 (t) = ( + ) ((1  nI (t))K0   k2 (t)) :
We assume that at time t = 0, the economy is in a steady-state so that the rental rate
of capital is equalized in the two sectors. As the price of good 2 drops, the interest rate in
sector 2 drops below that in sector 1. Old capital cannot be reallocated, but new investments
get reallocated to sector 1. Over time, the gap in the interest rates narrows and just as for
wages, there exists a time tK from which, interest rates are equalized and new investments get
allocated to both sectors (this is only the case if the long-run steady-state does not feature full
specialization, otherwise, new investments never get allocated to the shrinking sector). Except
for this, the structure of the equilibrium is similar to the baseline case.
Using the same type of analysis as in Appendix A.1, we can derive rst-order approxima-
tions for the time at which low-skill wages (t1), high-skill wages (t2) and capital are equalized
and second order approximations for the ages of the low-skill (aL) and high-skill (aH) workers
who are indi¤erent between switching sectors or not at the time of the shock. More specically,
if t1 < t2; tK , we can derive
t1 =
wss dpp + o (dp)
(w1H + w2H) (1  nH)xH (0)H + (w1L + w2L) (1  nL)xL (0) + (w1K + w2K) (1  nI) ( + )K0
.
Using this expression, it is easy to show that in this case, t1 is between its value when capital
is completely xed and when capital is fully exible. In this case, the age of the indi¤erent
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low-skill worker aL is given by (9), and we have that the mass of low-skill workers switching
sectors on impact is greater than in the case of sector-specic capital but smaller than in the
case where capital can immediately be transferred across sectors.
When t1 < t2 < tK , we can further derive the following expressions:
t2 =

vss   (v1L+v2L)wss(w1L+w2L)

dp
p + o (dp)24 v1H + v2H   (v1L+v2L)(w1H+w2H)w1L+w2L  (1  nH)xH (0)H
+

v1K + v2K   (v1L+v2L)(w1K+w2K)w1L+w2L

(1  nI) ( + )K0
35 ;
tK =
det
0@ w1L + w2L w1H + w2H wssv1L + v2L v1H + v2H vss
r1L + r2L r1H + r2H r
ss
1A dp
p + o (dp)
(1  nI) ( + )K0 det (Hessian) :
where Hessian is the Hessian matrix of F1 + pF2:
Hessian =
w1L + w2L w1H + w2H w1K + w2K
v1L + v2L v1H + v2H v1K + v2K
r1L + r2L r1H + r2H r1K + r2K
:
The age of the indi¤erent high-skill worker aH is still given by (A.7).
When t1 < tK < t2, we instead get (we present both cases because in our simulations we
encountered both situations):
tK =

rss   (r1L+r2L)wss(w1L+w2L)

dp
p + o (dp)
r1H + r2H   (r1L+r2L)(w1H+w2H)w1L+w2L

(1  nH)xH (0)H
+

r1K + r2K   (r1L+r2L)(w1K+w2K)w1L+w2L

(1  nI) ( + )K0
;
t2 =
det
0@ w1L + w2L wss w1K + w2Kv1L + v2L vss v1K + v2K
r1L + r2L r
ss r1K + r2K
1A dp
p + o (dp)
(1  nH)xH (0)H det (Hessian)
;
and the age of the indi¤erent high-skill worker obeys:
aH =
 xH (0) dpp
2
R T
0 x
0
H () e
 d

 
t2   (tK   t1) (v1L+v2L)w
ss
(w1L+w2L)vss
+w
ss((v1L+v2L)(r1K+r2K) (v1K+v2K)(r1L+r2L))+rss((w1L+w2L)(v1K+v2K) (w1K+w2K)(v1L+v2L))
((r1L+r2L)(w1K+w2K) (r1K+r2K)(w1L+w2L))vss (t2   tK)
!
:
This analysis straightforwardly extends to the case where the production functions depend
both on a stock of slowly transferable capital and a stock of fully sector-specic capital (which
grows at rate ): all expressions are identical (with the derivatives taken with respect to the
transferable capital).
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Figure A.1: Simulated Transition After Trade Shock. Case where half of the physical capital
stock is slowly transferable and half is xed. 10 percent price drop in sector 2.
A.4.2 Simulations
The calibration is done with the same parameters as in the case where capital is entirely xed,
but we assume that half of the capital stock in each sector is fully xed while the other half is
modeled as above. The depreciation rate is null ( = 0) and we focus on a 10% price change.
For price changes larger than 12%, an equilibrium akin to that described in Proposition 1
ceases to exist for the reason described in footnote 9 (however such an equilibrium would exist
for a higher level of the population growth rate ). Similarly as the share of fully sector-specic
capital shrinks, more labor must reallocate in the long-run. This shrinks the range of price
changes and population growth rates  for which an equilibrium as in Proposition 1 exists.
Figure A.1 reproduces Figure 6 for this scenario. Initially all factor prices are higher in
sector 1 than in sector 2. As a result, all new workers and all investments are allocated to
this sector until the relevant factor prices are equalized. Low-skill wages are equalized at
t1 = 5:18, then high-skill wages are equalized at t2 = 8:68 and nally the rental rates of
transferable capital are equalized at tK = 16:5. Low-skill workers younger than aL = 0:82
switch sectors on impact, while high-skill workers younger than aH = 1:59 do so. As expected
from the theoretical analysis, the reallocation takes longer and more worker switch on impact
relative to the case where capital is fully xed. The share of reallocation which happens on
impact for low-skill workers is given by L = 14:98%, while for high-skill workers it is given by
H = 20:17%. Figure A.1.B shows that the welfare consequences are similar to the case where
all capital is xed (when the share of fully xed capital shrinks, the welfare consequences look
more like that in the case with no capital Figure 4 with low-skill workers in sector 2 gaining
relative to the case with general human capital).
Figure A.2 reproduces Figure 7.A albeit for price changes of 0.1 to 10%. Quantitatively,
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Figure A.2: Times until wage equalization and ages of indi¤erent workers for di¤erent price
changes (simulation results and approximation results). Case where half of the physical capital
stock is slowly transferable and half is xed. 10 percent price drop in sector 2.
the quality of the approximation is in between the case where capital is entirely xed and that
where there is no capital. In particular the approximations for t1 and t2 are not too far o¤,
but the approximations for aL and aH are less good for price changes over 5%.
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B Online Appendix
B.1 Rest of the proof of Proposition 1
B.1.1 nL (t) and nH (t) are in (0; 1) for  su¢ ciently large
We now seek to show that, once wages have been equalized, it is possible to adjust the ow
of entrants nL (t), nH (t) in sector 1 so as to keep wages equalized for  su¢ ciently large
( > 1T ln

xL(T )
xL(0)

is a su¢ cient condition). We denote by nZ (t) the mass of workers of type
Z = L;H entering sector 1; to avoid confusion, we rewrite the original steady-state value as
nssZ instead of nZ . Once wages have been equalized, the normalized mass of low-skill workers
in sector 1 can be written as
l1 (t) = n
ss
L
Z T
min(t;T )
e xL () d + (1  nssL ) e txL (t)
Z min(aL;jT tj)
0
e d (B.1)
+
Z min(t;T )
min(t t1;T )
e xL () d +
Z min(t t1;T )
0
e( )nL (t  )xL () d for t  t1:
Compared with equation (7), there is a new term representing the entrants who have arrived
since the equalization of wages (the rst three terms are generalized to the case where t is
su¢ ciently large that workers who switched start to die o¤). Similarly, the normalized mass
of low-skill workers in sector 2 and of high-skill workers in sectors 1 and 2 can be written
as follows:
l2 (t) = (1  nssL )
Z T
min(t+aL;T )
e xL () d+
Z min(t t1;T )
0
e( ) (1  nL (t  ))xL () d for t  t1;
(B.2)
h1 (t)
H
= nssH
Z T
min(t;T )
e xH () d + e txL (t) (1  nssH )
Z min(aH ;jT tj)
0
e d (B.3)
+
Z min(t;T )
min(t t2;T )
e xH () d +
Z min(t t2;T )
0
e( )nH (t  )xH () d for t  t2;
h2 (t)
H
= (1  nssH )
Z T
min(t+aH ;T )
e xL () d+
Z min(t t2;T )
0
e( ) (1  nH (t  ))xH () d for t  t2:
(B.4)
The functions nL (t) and nH (t) must satisfy v1 (t) = v2 (t) for t  t2 and w1 (t) = w2 (t) for
t  t1, and our goal is to show that the solutions to these equations fall in the range (0; 1).
Summing (B.1) and (B.2) and then summing (B.3) and (B.4), we obtain:
l (t) = l1 (t)+l2 (t) = l
eff (1  nssL ) e t
Z min(aL;jT tj)
0
e  (xL ( + t)  xL (t)) d = leff+o
 
dp4

;
h (t) = h1 (t)+h2 (t) = h
eff H (1  nssH ) e t
Z min(aH ;jT tj)
0
e  (xH ( + t)  xH (t)) d = heff+o
 
dp4

;
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these equalities show that, at forth order, the masses of normalized factors are constant.
First, we consider the case where t 2 (t1; t2), so that only wages of low-skill workers are
equalized and t is small. Equation (A.3) still holds, and di¤erentiating (B.1) and (B.2) for
small price changes and small t yields
dl1 (t) =  dl2 (t) = ((t  t1) (nL (t)  nssL ) + t1 (1  nssL ))xL (0) + o (dp) :
Plugging these expressions into dw1 = dw2 + o (dp) and using (8), the result is
(t  t1)
 
(w1H + w2H) (1  nssH )xH (0)H + (w1L + w2L) (nL (t)  nssL )xL (0)

= o (dp) ;
therefore,
nL (t)  nssL =  
(w1H + w2H) (1  nH)xH (0)H
(w1L + w2L)xL (0)
+ o (1) :
Since (w1H + w2H) (1  nH)xH (0)H + (w1L + w2L) (1  nH)xL (0) < 0 if t1 < t2, it follows
that nL (t) is in (0; 1) for small price changes when t 2 (t1; t2).
For t > t2, wages are equalized in both sectors. This implies, absent any factor intensity
reversal, that wages must be at the new steady-state value: w2 (t) = w1 (t) = wss0 and v2 (t) =
v1 (t) = v
ss0. Hence factor intensity in each sector must likewise be at the new steady state
values, so we must have
l1 (t) =
l (t)  lss02
lss02
h (t)
1  lss02
hss02
hss01
lss01

(as well as similar expressions for h2 (t), l1 (t), and l2 (t)). Furthermore, observe that
dl(t)
dt =
O
 
dp2

, where O
 
dp2

is a function of time and dp, which satises
O  dp2 < Mdp2 for some
positive real M ; similarly, dh(t)dt = O
 
dp2

. Therefore dl1(t)dt = O
 
dp2

and similarly for dl2(t)dt ,
dh1(t)
dt , and
dh2(t)
dt .
More specically, assume that t2 < t < T  max (aH ; aL). Then
dh1 (t)
dt
1
H
=  e tnssHxH (t) + (1  nssH )
d
dt
 
e txH (t)
 Z aH
0
e d + e txH (t)
 e(t t2)xH (t  t2) + nH (t)xH (0) +
Z t t2
0
nH (t  ) d (e
 xH ())
d
d ;
dh2 (t)
dt
1
H
=  e (t+aH) (1  nssH )xH (t+ aH)+(1  nH (t))xH (0)+
Z t t2
0
(1  nH (t  )) d (e
 xH ())
d
d :
Similar expressions can be derived for low-skill workers:
dl1 (t)
dt
=  e tnssL xL (t) + (1  nssL )
d
dt
 
e txL (t)
 Z aL
0
e d + e txL (t)
 e (t t1)xL (t  t1) + nL (t)xL (0) +
Z t t1
0
nL (t  ) d (e
 xL ())
d
d ;
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dl2 (t)
dt
=  e (t+aL) (1  nssL )xL (t+ aL)+(1  nL (t))xL (0)+
Z t t1
0
(1  nL (t  )) d (e
 xL ())
d
d :
Since dl1(t)dt = O
 
dp2

, we have
 e tnssL xL (t) + nL (t)xL (0) +
Z t t1
0
nL (t  ) d (e
 xL ())
d
d = O (dp) .
Because t1 and t2 are rst order, this equation can be rewritten as
(nL (t)  nssL )xL (0) +
Z t t2
0
(nL (t  )  nssL )
d (e xL ())
d
d = O (dp) : (B.5)
Note that nL (t) = nssL for t 2 (t2; T  max (aH ; aL)) is a solution to this functional equation
when the right-hand side is exactly equal to 0. Hence there must be a solution of (B.5) that
can be written as nL (t) = nssL + O (dp), where O (dp) is a function of time and dp, which
satises jO (dp)j < Ndp for some number N and all t. Then, for dp su¢ ciently small, nL (t)
will be close to nssL ; in particular, nL (t) belongs to (0; 1). The same reasoning holds for nH (t).
Without loss of generality, we assume that aH > aL and examine the case where T   aL 
t < T   aH . The expressions for the derivatives of h1 (t) and h2 (t) remain identical, but those
for the derivatives of l1 (t) and l2 (t) now become
dl1 (t)
dt
=  e tnssL xL (t) + (1  nssL )
Z T t
0
e d
d
dt
 
e txL (t)
  (1  nssL )xL (t) e T
+e txL (t)  e(t t1)xL (t  t1) + nL (t)xL (0) +
Z t t1
0
nL (t  ) d (e
 xL ())
d
d ;
dl2 (t)
dt
= (1  nL (t))xL (0) +
Z t t1
0
(1  nL (t  )) d (e
 xL ())
d
d : (B.6)
Using a similar argument as the one for (B.5) and given that T   t is second order for this time
interval, we obtain
  (1  nssL ) e TxL (T )+(nL (t)  nssL )xL (0)+
Z t t2
0
(nL (t  )  nssL )
d (e xL ())
d
d = O (dp) :
This equation implies, since nL (t) = nssL +O (dp) (except for t  t2, that is for a time period
of duration O (dp)), that
nL (t) = n
ss
L + (1  nssL ) e T
xL (T )
xL (0)
+O (dp) : (B.7)
Therefore, nL (t) 2 (0; 1) for dp su¢ ciently small provided
 >
1
T
ln

xL (T )
xL (0)

:
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The same reasoning holds when T   aH  t < T but now it applies to both high-skill and
low-skill workers. Suppose now that T  t < T + t1. Then
dl1 (t)
dt
=  e(t t1)xL (t  t1) + nL (t)xL (0) +
Z t t1
0
nL (t  ) d (e
 xL ())
d
d ;
dh1 (t)
dt
1
H
=  e(t t2)xH (t  t2) + nH (t)xH (0) +
Z t t2
0
nH (t  ) d (e
 xH ())
d
d ;
at the same time, (B.6) and the equivalent equation for dh2dt hold. In this case,
dh(t)
dt =
dl(t)
dt = 0
and so
  (1  nssL ) e(t t1)xL (t  t2)+(nL (t)  nssL )xL (0)+
Z t t1
0
(nL (t  )  nssL )
d (e xL ())
d
d = 0;
therefore (B.7) still holds. Hence for  > 1T ln

xL(T )
xL(0)

and su¢ ciently small dp, we have
nL (t) 2 (0; 1). The same reasoning applies to high-skill workers and extends to low-skill
workers when T + t1 < t < T + t2.
Finally if T + t1  t then the derivatives for high-skill workers can be written as
dh1
dt
1
H
=  dh2
dt
1
H
=   (nH (t  T )  nssH )xH (T ) e Td + (nH (t)  nssH )xH (0)
+
Z T
0
(nH (t  )  nssH )
de xH ()
d
d ;
as a result, the counterpart of (B.5) is now
(nH (t)  nssH )xH (0) = (nH (t  T )  nssH )xH (T ) e Td 
Z T
0
(nH (t  )  nssH )
de xH ()
d
d :
From this expression it follows directly that a solution exists where nH (t) belongs to (0; 1)
when xH (T ) e T =xH (0) < 1. Moreover, nssH (t) is close to n
ss
H except for a set of measure
O (dp). For T + t2  t, the reasoning extends to low-skilled workers. This completes the proof
of existence
B.1.2 Production e¢ ciency
We now prove that this equilibrium (when it exists) maximizes the present value of production
(if it is nite) or the present value of production up to some date t  T . At any instant
t > T , the competitive equilibrium described reproduces the outcome of a general human
capital economy and therefore it does indeed maximize production. Therefore, we only have
to show that the competitive equilibrium maximizes the discounted value of production from
0 to T .
First, we compare the present value of production in the competitive equilibrium described
above with the present value of production in the (unique) competitive equilibrium obtained
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in a model with general human capital. Note that with general human capital, the compet-
itive equilibrium maximizes the present value of production. Relative to the general human
capital allocation, the allocation of the sector-specic human capital model corresponds to a
misallocation of factors and a decrease in the endowments. The misallocation of factors is rst
order in the price change. By the envelope theorem, it has a second-order e¤ect on the value
of production at a given time. This misallocation of factors, however, only last for a period
of time which is rst order in the price change (until wages are equalized). Therefore, it has
a third order e¤ect on the present value of production. The loss of e¤ective units of human
capital occurs as workers switch sectors. Since only a second order mass of workers switch, and
since these workers have accumulated only a second order amount of human capital, this loss
only has a forth order impact. Therefore, the di¤erence between the maximal present value in
the general human capital case and the present value obtained in the competitive equilibrium
with sector specic-human capital is third order in the price change. As the maximal present
value of production with general human capital must be weakly greater than its counterpart
with sector-specic human capital, it follows that their di¤erence must be at most third order
in the price change.
Since the steady-state allocation maximizes the value of output before the trade shock, the
allocation of factors which maximizes the present value of production di¤ers from the steady-
state allocation at most at rst order.33 Therefore the marginal product of factors across sector
di¤ers at most at rst order. Moreover, they may only di¤er at rst order for a rst order
period of time (otherwise the di¤erence in the present value of production relative to the case
with general human capital will be more than third order).
Let us then consider a (low-skill or high-skill) worker born after the trade shock. Denote
by 1 the time he spends in sector 1 and by 2 the time he spends in sector 2 in the present
value maximizing allocation. Without loss of generality, assume that 1  2. Let us consider
an alternative allocation where he would spend all of his time in sector 1 instead. This worker
would then provide a higher level of human capital which translates into a gain in the present
value of production of the same order as 2. The potential loss arises from a (possible) lower
value of the marginal product of his type of human capital in sector 1 than in the sector 2.
This loss is at most of second order (since marginal products are identical at rst order except
potentially for a rst order period of time - where they may di¤er at rst order). Therefore,
this allocation of the workers time can only be part of the social optimum if 2 is second
order. The potential loss is then at most of the same order as 2dp, and must be smaller than
the benet. As a result, in the optimal allocation, newborn workers must remain in the same
sector. Similarly workers who were already born at the time of the shock may only switch at
the time of the shock and their accumulated experience at that time can only be second order.
33Technically this only holds almost everywhere, that is everywhere except for a time period of mass 0. All
identities in the following are similarly holding almost everywhere.
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Given that the optimal number of workers switch at the time of the trade shock, no workers
would subsequently switch sectors, the problem of nding the optimal allocation at t > 0 is
simply one of nding the share of workers entering each sector (the endowments in e¤ective
units of human capital are xed). Maximizing the present value of production requires to have
workers being allocated to the sector with the largest marginal product of their human capital
up until there are no more new workers to allocate or the marginal products are equalized
across sectors. Since the initial switch is second order, marginal factor products are initially
higher in sector 1 and both types of workers are initially allocated to sector 1. Our analysis
of the competitive equilibrium shows that once marginal products have been equalized, it is
possible to ensure that they remain equalize all along (provided that  is su¢ ciently large and
the price change is small). Therefore marginal products in sector 1 must remain higher than
in sector 2, and the initial switch only concerns workers of sector 2.
As a result, the optimal allocation takes the same form as the competitive allocation de-
scribed above, with the share of entrants being allocated to the di¤erent sectors solving the
same equations, but the mass of workers switching sectors at time 0 may still be di¤erent. To
nd this mass, we solve:
max
aL;aH
Z T
0
e ( )t (y1 (t) + py2 (t)) ;
where y1 and y2 are the normalized amount of output, with the following constraints:
y1 (t) = F1 (l1 (t) ; h1 (t)) and y2 (t) = F2 (l2 (t) ; h2 (t)) ;
l1 (t) = n
ss
L
Z T
t
e xL () d + (1  nssL ) e txL (t)
Z min(aL;T t)
0
e d (B.8)
+
Z t
max(0;t t1)
e xL () d +
Z max(0;t t1)
0
e nL (t  )xL () d:
(this expression comes from (7) and (B.1)),
l2 (t) = (1  nssL )
Z T
t+aL
e xL () d +
Z max(0;t t1)
0
e  (1  nL (t  ))xL () d; (B.9)
with similar constraints for h1 (t) and h2 (t), and where t1; t2; nL (t) ; nH (t) are dened as in
the competitive case.
The rst order equation with respect to aL leads to:Z T
0
e ( )t

w1 (t)
@
@aL
l1 (t) + w2 (t)
@
@aL
l2 (t)

= 0;
where w1 (t) is the marginal product of low-skill labor in sector 1 (and similarly w2 (t) in sector
2). Computing the integral separately over the intervals (0; t1), (t1; T   aL) and (T   aL; T )
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and using that w1 (t) = w2 (t) = w (t) after t1 gives:Z t1
0
e ( )t

w1 (t) e
 txL (t) e aL   w2 (t) e (t+aL)xL (t+ aL) d

+
Z T aL
t1
e ( )tw (t) e (t+aL) (xL (t)  xL (t+ aL)) d
= 0;
which, in turn, can be rewritten as (5). The same holds for aH . Therefore the equilibrium
allocation maximizes the present value of production.
B.2 Speed of human capital accumulation and t2
In this appendix, we show formally that a faster accumulation function delays t2. We use
a b to denote variables under the alternative accumulation functions bxL; bxH . Dene  R T
0 bxL () e d =R T0 xL () e d > 1, we then get blmax = lmax, and since bxH =
bxL and xH = xL we also have bhmax = hmax. The production functions are homoge-
neous of degree one. As a result, their rst derivatives are homogeneous of degree 0, hence
F1L

nLblmax; nHbhmax = F1L (nLlmax; nHhmax), and similarly for sector 2 and the derivatives
with respect to H. Therefore the allocation shares nL and nH are identical in steady-state in
both scenarios, and we have bvss = vss and bwss = wss. The second derivatives are homogeneous
of degree -1, so that bviZ =  1viZ for i 2 f1; 2g and Z 2 fL;Hg and similarly for w. Applying
(A.6), we then get:
bt2 = bvss   bv1L+bv2Lbw1L+ bw2L bwss
(1  nH) bxH (0)H bv1H + bv2H   (bv1L+bv2L)( bw1H+ bw2H)bw1L+ bw2L 
dp
p
+ o (dp)
=
vss   v1L+v2Lw1L+w2Lwss
(1  nH)xH (0)H 1

v1H + v2H   (v1L+v2L)(w1H+w2H)w1L+w2L
 dp
p
+ o (dp)
= t2 + o (dp) > t2 + o (dp) :
B.3 Proof of Proposition 4
This section provides details about the adjustment program. We restrict attention to the
case where xH = xL, and the subsidy is nanced lump-sum by high-skill workers. Assume
that workers who switch sectors receive, over their lifetime, a sum with present value SZ ,
Z 2 fL;Hg, regardless of their age. SZ is rst order in the price change and small enough
that full adjustment is not reached. The indi¤erent workers are now characterized byZ T aL
0
w1 ()xL () e
 d + SL =
Z T aL
0
w2 ()xL (aL + ) e
 d; (B.10)
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Z T aH
0
v1 ()xH () e
 d + SH =
Z T aH
0
v2 ()xH (aH + ) e
 d (B.11)
instead of by (5) and (6). Even for a marginal price change, an extremely old worker may
be willing to switch sectors in order to claim the subsidy before dying even if w1 ()xL () <
w2 ()xL (aL + ) (and v1 ()xH () < v2 ()xH (aH + )) throughout his lifetime. We there-
fore assume that the subsidy is distributed over a time period of nonnegligible duration so
that very old workers do not switch. We assume that the subsidy is proportional to entrants
steady-state wages: SL = swssxL (0) and SH = svssxH (0). The number of workers who switch
is now rst order, and taking into account that xH = xL, the age of the indi¤erent worker of
skill-type Z must be given by (12). Note that we still have w1 (0) > w2 (0) and v1 (0) > v2 (0),
and that the structure of the equilibrium stays the same.
For t < t1; t2, (A.2) and (A.3) become:
dl1 (t) =  dl2 (t) = (1  nL)xL (0) (s+ t) ;
dh1 (t) =  dh2 (t) = (1  nH)HxH (0) (s+ t) ;
so that low-skill wages are equalized rst when (A.4) is satised.
Assume that it is indeed satised, then, following the same strategy as in Appendix (A.1),
we get that
t1 = t
0
1   s;
where t01  w
ss
p dp=
 
(w1H + w2H) (1  nH)xH (0)H + (w1L + w2L) (1  nL)xL (0)

is the rst-
order approximation of t1 when there is no subsidy assuming that t1 < t2. For t < t1, wages
for low-skill workers are given by:
dw1 (t) = dw
0
1 (s+ t) + o (dp) and dw2 (t) = dw
0
2 (s+ t) + o (dp) ; (B.12)
where dw01 and dw
0
2 represent the changes in wages when there are no subsidy. Similarly
t2 = t
0
2   s+ o (dp) ; (B.13)
with t02 

vss   v1L+v2Lw1L+w2Lwss

dp
p =

(1  nH)xH (0)H

v1H + v2H   (v1L+v2L)(w1H+w2H)w1L+w2L

de-
ned similarly as t01. For t 2 (t1; t2), we get
dw1 (t) = dw2 (t) = dw
0 (s+ t) :
Therefore the subsidy simply shifts the transition. Since w1 (t) ; w2 (t)  wss0 all along, and
since (at rst-order) discounting can be ignored, we get that all low-skill workers who do not
receive the subsidy are worse-o¤ with it (except, possibly, workers who are su¢ ciently old
and retire during the transition period). Workers who do receive the subsidy get a rst-order
benet from it. The direct impact of the subsidy on the aggregate life-time income of low-skill
workers can be written as aL (1  nL)SL and is proportional to s2.
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Yet, the change in aggregate income relative to steady-state for all low-skill workers alive
at t = 0 can be written as
dW =  s
0@ (1  nL)w2L v1H+v2Hv1L+v2L   w2H+ nL w1H   w1L v1H+v2Hv1L+v2L  (v1L + v2L)wss
  (w1L + w2L)

w1H   w1Lw1H+w2Hw1L+w2L

vss
1A
(w1L + w2L) (v1H + v2H)  (v1L + v2L)2
dp
p

Z T
0
xL () e
 d

+K0 +K1s
2 + o
 
dp2

;
where K0 and K1 are independent of s. Knowing that w1H w1Lw1H+w2Hw1L+w2L < 0, w2L
(v1H+v2H)
(v1L+v2L)
 
w2H < 0, w1H w1L (v1H+v2H)(v1L+v2L) < 0 and (w1L + w2L) (v1H + v2H) (v1L + v2L)
2 > 0, the impact
of the subsidy on the change in aggregate income dW is negative for s small enough.
B.4 Gross ows model
In this appendix we solve the extended model with gross ows due to nonpecuniary sector
preferences (as rst presented in Section 5). First, we derive the mass of entrants in each state
in a steady-state where the share of workers in a biased state is the same across all ages and
then compute the gross ows. Second, we derive the system of partial derivatives equations
that the utilities of workers must satisfy in equilibrium, and solve it in steady-state. Third, we
derive the equilibrium following a small price shock.
B.4.1 Step 1: Number of entrants and gross ows
Denote by gi (t) the mass of high-skill workers in state i = 0; 1; 2 at time t (that is workers
with no sectoral preference, workers biased towards sector 1 and workers biased towards sector
2), and denote by egi (t) the ow of entrants in state i at time t. Workers die with a Poisson
rate , switch from state 0 to each of the biased state with a Poisson rate =2, and switch from
each of the biased state to state 0 with a Poisson rate 1=2. We then have the following system
of di¤erential equations:
dg0
dt
(t) =   (+ ) g0 (t) + 1
2
g1 (t) +
1
2
g2 (t) + eg0 (t) ;
dg1
dt
(t) =

2
g0 (t) 

1
2
+ 

g1 (t) + eg1 (t) ;
dg2
dt
(t) =

2
g0 (t) 

1
2
+ 

g2 (t) + eg2 (t) :
In steady state, all gi (t) and egi (t) are constant. Furthermore, if the share of biased individuals
is the same across ages then gi (t) = 1 egi (t). (Note that, for a death rate , the total mass of
high-skill workers alive is given by  1H, where H is the size of an incoming generation.) We
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can now solve the system to obtain that, in steady state,
eg0 = 1
1 + 2
, eg1 = eg2 = 
1 + 2
.
The workers who switch sectors between t and t + dt are the normal workers who become
biased toward working in a di¤erent sector than the one in which they are employed in at time
t. Therefore, a share 2
1
1+2 (per unit of time) of workers switches sectors.
B.4.2 Step 2: System satised by the value functions of workers
Recall that our assumption that nonpecuniary benets are su¢ ciently large that a biased
worker in state i always works in sector i. Denote by W j0 (t; a) the value function of a low-skill
worker of experience a at time t in the normal state in sector j, and denote by Wi (t; a) the
value function of a low-skill worker of age a at time t in the biased state i 2 f1; 2g (and so, by
assumption, in sector i). The set of value functions must then satisfy
W1 (t; a) = (w1 (t)xL (a) + b) dt+

1  1
2
dt  dt

W1 (t+ dt; a+ dt)+
1
2
dtW 10 (t+ dt; a+ dt) :
(B.14)
Intuitively, biased workers in state 1 work in sector 1, receive wages w1 (t)xL (a) and enjoy
the nonpecuniary benet b, die with probability dt, and revert back to the normal state with
probability 12dt (without switching sectors). Similarly, we have
W2 (t; a) = (w2 (t)xL (a) + b) dt+

1  1
2
dt  dt

W2 (t+ dt; a+ dt)+
1
2
dtW 20 (t+ dt; a+ dt) :
(B.15)
Workers in the normal state can become biased with probability 2dt for each biased state.
If they remain unbiased, they decide rationally whether or not switch sectors. Irrespective of
the reason, a worker who switches sectors loses all her accumulated experience. Hence the
value function for unbiased workers in sector 1 is
W 10 (t; a) = w1 (t)xL (a) dt+ (1  dt  dt) max
 
W 10 (t+ dt; a+ dt) ;W
2
0 (t+ dt; 0)

(B.16)
+

2
dtW1 (t+ dt; a+ dt) +

2
dtW2 (t+ dt; 0) ;
and similarly for sector 2:
W 20 (t; a) = w2 (t)xL (a) dt+ (1  dt  dt) max
 
W 10 (t+ dt; 0) ;W
2
0 (t+ dt; a+ dt)

(B.17)
+

2
dtW1 (t+ dt; 0) +

2
dtW2 (t+ dt; a+ dt) :
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In steady state, w1 (t) = w2 (t) = w, the problem is stationary and normal workers never
switch sectors. Dene
 !
W    W1 W 10 W2 W 20 , and add a superscript ss for the steady-
state values (
  !
W ss depends only on experience, not on time). The problem then simplies
to
d
da
  !
W ss (a) = B
  !
W ss (a)   wxL (a) + b 2W ss2 (0) + wxL (a) wxL (a) + b 2W ss1 (0) + wxL (a) T ;
where
B =
0BB@
1
2 +   12 0 0
 2 +  0 0
0 0 12 +   12
0 0  2 + 
1CCA :
This matrix is diagonalizable with eigenvalues given by 1 and 2, where 1  14 +  + 12  
1
4
 
1 + 42
 1
2 and 2  14 +  + 12 + 14
 
1 + 42
 1
2 are both positive. The solution to such a
linear system of di¤erential equations can be written as
  !
W ss (a) = eBa
  !
W ss (0) weBa
Z a
0
xL (s) e
 Bs !1 ds+B 1  I   eBa   b 2W ss2 (0) b 2W ss1 (0) T ;
where
 !
1 =
 
1 1 1 1
T
. We assume that the accumulation function xL is such that
lim
s!1
xL (s) e Bs = 0, and we dene  !XL (a)    R1a xL (s) e Bs !1 ds. Since   !W ss must remain
bounded and eBa is unbounded, we get the following condition:
  !
W ss (0) =  w !XL (0) +B 1
 
b 2W
ss
2 (0) b

2W
ss
1 (0)
T
: (B.18)
Solving for this system denes
  !
W ss (0), after which we can write
  !
W ss (a) =  weBa !XL (a) +B 1
 
b 2W
ss
2 (0) b

2W
ss
1 (0)
T
: (B.19)
B.4.3 Step 3: Equilibrium following a small price shock
We assume the existence of an equilibrium with a structure similar to the equilibrium described
in Proposition 1 that is, in which normal workers switch only upon impact and the wages
of high-skill (resp. low-skill) workers are equalized after a time t2 (resp. t1). A continuous
version of the system of equations (B.14), (B.15), (B.16), and (B.17) exists and can be written
as
@
@a
 !
W (t; a) +
@
@t
 !
W (t; a) (B.20)
= B
 !
W (t; a) B !W (t; a)
    w1 (t)xL (a) + b 2W2 (t; 0) + w1 (t)xL (a) w2 (t)xL (a) + b 2W1 (t; 0) + w2 (t)xL (a) T :
The worker from sector 2 who is indi¤erent between staying in that sector or switching will
have an experience level given by aL, which satises
W 20 (0; aL) = W
1
0 (0; 0) :
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As before, after max (t1; t2) all wages are constant at their steady-state value; hence
 !
W is also
constant over time at its new steady-state value. Without loss of generality, we assume that
t1 < t2. Then
W 10 (t2; t2) W 10 (0; 0) =
Z t2
0

@W1
@t
+
@W1
@a

d
=
Z t2
0

(+ )W 10 ( ; ) 

2
W1 ( ; )  
2
W2 ( ; 0)  w1 ()xL ()

d;
where we have used (B.20). A rst-order Taylor expansion ofW 10 ( ; ) ; W1 ( ; ), andW2 ( ; 0)
of order 1 around (t2; t2), (t2; t2), and (t2; 0), respectively, gives
W 10 (t2; t2) W 10 (0; 0)
= t2

(+ )W 10 (t2; t2) 

2
W1 (t2; t2)  
2
W2 (t2; 0)

 

(+ )

@W 10
@t
(t2; t2) +
@W 10
@a
(t2; t2)

  
2

@W1
@t
(t2; t2) +
@W1
@a
(t2; t2)

  
2

@W2
@t
(t2; 0)

t22
2
 
Z t2
0
w1 ()xL () d + o
 
t22

:
After t2,
 !
W is independent of time: @W
1
0
@t (t2; t2) =
@W1
@t (t2; t2) =
@W2
@t (t2; 0) = 0. Using
superscript ss0 to denote the new steady state, we can now rewrite the previous equation as
W 01 (t2; t2) W1 (0; 0) = t2

(+ )W 1ss00 (t2) 

2
W ss01 (t2) 

2
W ss02 (0)

 

(+ )
dW 1ss00
da
(t2)  
2
dW ss01
da
(t2)

t22
2
 
Z t2
0
w1 ()xL () d + o
 
t22

:
Similarly, we have
W 20 (t2; t2 + a) W 20 (0; a)
= t2

(+ )W 2ss00 (t2 + a) 

2
W ss02 (t2 + a) 

2
W ss01 (0)

 

(+ )
dW 2ss00
da
(t2 + a)  
2
dW ss02
da
(t2 + a)

t22
2
 
Z t2
0
w2 ()xL ( + a) d + o
 
t22

:
Next we take the di¤erence between the two equations and use that W 1ss00 = W 2ss00 and
W ss01 = W ss02 to obtain
W 10 (t2; t2) W1 (0; 0) 
 
W 20 (t2; t2 + a) W 20 (0; a)

= t2

(+ )
 
W 1ss00 (t2) W 1ss00 (t2 + a)
  
2
 
W ss01 (t2) W ss01 (t2 + a)

+

(+ )

dW 1ss00
da
(t2 + a)  dW
1ss0
0
da
(t2)

  
2

dW ss01
da
(t2 + a)  dW
ss0
1
da
(t2)

t22
2
+
Z t2
0
(w2 ()xL ( + a)  w1 ()xL ()) d + o
 
t22

:
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Consider the indi¤erent worker. Since aL must be at most rst order and since W1 (0; 0) =
W 20 (0; aL) by denition, it follows that
W 1ss00 (t2) W 1ss00 (t2 + aL) =  t2aL

(+ )
dW 1ss00
da
(t2)  
2
dW ss01
da
(t2)

+
Z t2
0
(w2 ()xL ( + aL)  w1 ()xL ()) d + o
 
t22

+ o (aLt2) :
Now if aL were rst order, then the LHS would have the same order as aL while the RHS
would be of order 2 at most (because w2 ()xL ( + a)   w1 ()xL () is of rst order in the
price change). Since this is impossible, aL must be of second order. As a result, the previous
equation simplies to
W 1ss00 (t2) W 1ss00 (t2 + aH) =
Z t2
0
(w2 ()xL ( + aL)  w1 ()xL ()) d + o
 
dp2

:
Now using that t2 is at most rst order so that t2

dW 1ss00
da (0) 
dW 1ss00 (aL)
da

would be of third
order and wages would be equalized after t1 we have
W 1ss00 (0) W 1ss00 (aL) = xL (0)
Z t1
0
(w2 ()  w1 ()) d + o
 
dp2

: (B.21)
Equation (B.19) yields
  !
W ss0 (aL) 
  !
W ss0 (0) = wss0
Z 1
0
(xL (s+ aL)  xL (s)) e Bs !1 ds

(B.22)
= aLw
ss0
Z 1
0
x0L (s) e
 Bs !1 ds

+ o
 
dp2

Matrix B can be decomposed as B = PDP 1 for
P 
0BBB@
1 1 0 0
1
2   +
 
1
4 + 
2
 1
2 1
2    
 
1
4 + 
2
 1
2 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 12   +
 
1
4 + 
2
 1
2 1
2    
 
1
4 + 
2
 1
2
1CCCA
and
D  Diag (1; 2; 1; 2) ;
so (B.22) leads to
W 1ss00 (aL) W 1ss00 (0) (B.23)
= aLw
ss
Z 1
0
x0L (s)
1
2

1 +
 
1 + 42
  1
2

e 1s +

1   1 + 42  12 e 2s ds+ o  dp2 :
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As in Section A.1, we can establish the rst-order development of changes in the e¤ective
mass of low-skill workers in each sector to obtain
dl1 (t) =  dl2 (t) = (1  nL) 1
1 + 2
xL (0) t+ o (dp) for 0  t  t1, t2: (B.24)
The di¤erence between (B.24) and (A.2) arises because only a fraction (1 + 2) 1 of the new-
born generation can be allocated to either sectors (the other workers are in biased states). A
similar expression holds for dh1 and dh2. This directly leads to (15), and (B.21), (B.23), and
(B.24) together imply (16). Following the same steps as in Section A.1, we can then derive
t2 =

vss   v1L+v2Lw1L+w2Lwss

(1 + 2)
(1  nH)xH (0)H

v1H + v2H   (v1L+v2L)(w1H+w2H)w1L+w2L
 dp
p
+ o (dp) ;
aH =  
xH (0)

t2   w
ss(v1L+v2L)
vss(w1L+w2L)
(t2   t1)

R1
0 x
0
H (s)

1 +
 
1 + 42
  1
2

e 1s +

1   1 + 42  12 e 2s ds dpp + o
 
dp2

:
Finally, the same reasoning as in Section A.1 shows that this is indeed an equilibrium.
B.5 Taylor expansion to one additional order
In Figure B.1, the left panel copies Figure 7.A, while the right panel compares the numerical
values for t1, t2, aL and aH with analytical values obtained from approximation techniques
when we include one additional order. Including this additional term improves the t signi-
cantly (except for aH for price changes beyond 15%).
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Figure B.1: Times until wage equalization and ages of indi¤erent workers, simulation results
and approximation results. Panel A computes the approximation at rst order for t1 and t2 and
second order for aL and aH . Panel B computes them at second and third order respectively.
Case with sector-specic physical capital.
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